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National Security in Divided Government

Executive Summary

- Divided government is the norm in recent history, not the exception. In the last 58 years, 36 years had at least one of the three bodies (President, House, or Senate) led by the opposite party. Now it will be 38 of 60 years.
- Regardless of unified or divided government, the Congress passed and the president still signed both a defense authorization bill and an appropriations bill that funded defense and intelligence activities into law each year. In all years, the defense committees operated in the main in their traditional bipartisan fashion.
- The deficit, interest on the debt, the debt ceiling, and a focus on reducing spending will add to the degree of difficulty in reaching bipartisan budget compromises.
- Republicans in the House are expected to continue the recent increases in defense funding—though they will have to contend with the deficit hawks and isolationist wings of both parties—increase the focus on addressing the threat from China, look into military personnel policies that they view are tied to progressive social agendas and are hurting recruitment, and conduct vigorous oversight of DOD in areas they view the Biden administration is vulnerable, such as the Afghanistan withdrawal, a potential nuclear deal with Iran, and inflation's impact on the military and their families. Republicans are also expected to challenge elements of the national defense strategy including the concept of "integrated deterrence," restrain allocation of defense resources for climate change, question the vaccine mandate, and the budget approach of "divest to invest." Other areas of focus are likely to include critical rare earth minerals, supply chain constraints, border security, and workforce recruiting and retention.
- A Democratic Senate will retain the ability to process nominations, block House-passed legislation, have a strong voice on spending negotiations, and provide counter-oversight.
- The Secretary of Defense and the Department need to continue a pragmatic, bipartisan approach to deal with these new Congressional realities, just as the defense committees—despite predictable differences—will continue to operate in a bipartisan manner.
- President Biden retains the veto power, but it should be recognized that a president can veto something out of a bill but hardly ever can veto something into a bill. But it is unlikely that the Senate will pass any veto-bait bill.

Punaro worked with the Senate Armed Services Committee for 24 years for Sen. Sam Nunn (D-GA), with 14 years as Staff Director or Minority Staff Director. During those 14 years, 12 were during divided government and 10 were with a Democratic House and Republican president. As staff director in that time frame, he helped develop a SASC/Senate approach to ensure a strong conference position and outcome to deal with the predictable House positions opposed by the administration. He also has extensive experience in uniform, in industry, in associations, and on DOD boards and commissions.

National Security in Divided Government

In the first two years of the Biden Administration, the Democratic party controlled the executive branch and both houses of the Congress. But as we view the results of the recent 2022 midterm election, one that saw the House flip to a narrow Republican majority, it is useful to consider what the implications might be for the US defense establishment and its supporting industrial base. Given the return of divided government, what does this mean for how government could work for the next two years? In particular, is there anything to be learned from past experience that would help federal agencies, industry, and their leaders navigate successfully, especially in the national security field?

What History Tells us about Divided Government

Congress #	Year	Admin.	POTUS	Senate	House
89	1965	Johnson	D	D	D
89	1966	Johnson	D	D	D
90	1967	Johnson	D	D	D
90	1968	Johnson	D	D	D
91	1969	Nixon	R	D	D
91	1970	Nixon	R	D	D
92	1971	Nixon	R	D	D
92	1972	Nixon	R	D	D
93	1973	Nixon	R	D	D
93	1974	Nixon	R	D	D
94	1975	Ford	R	D	D
94	1976	Ford	R	D	D
95	1977	Carter	D	D	D
95	1978	Carter	D	D	D
96	1979	Carter	D	D	D
96	1980	Carter	D	D	D
97	1981	Reagan	R	R	D
97	1982	Reagan	R	R	D
98	1983	Reagan	R	R	D
98	1984	Reagan	R	R	D
99	1985	Reagan	R	R	D
99	1986	Reagan	R	R	D
100	1987	Reagan	R	D	D
100	1988	Reagan	R	D	D
101	1989	Bush I	R	D	D
101	1990	Bush I	R	D	D
102	1991	Bush I	R	D	D
102	1992	Bush I	R	D	D
103	1993	Clinton	D	D	D
103	1994	Clinton	D	D	D
104	1995	Clinton	D	R	R
104	1996	Clinton	D	R	R
105	1997	Clinton	D	R	R
105	1998	Clinton	D	R	R
106	1999	Clinton	D	R	R
106	2000	Clinton	D	R	R
107	2001	Bush II	R	D/R	R
107	2002	Bush II	R	R	R
108	2003	Bush II	R	R	R
108	2004	Bush II	R	R	R
109	2005	Bush II	R	R	R
109	2006	Bush II	R	R	R
110	2007	Bush II	R	D	D
110	2008	Bush II	R	D	D
111	2009	Obama	D	D	D
111	2010	Obama	D	D	D
112	2011	Obama	D	D	R
112	2012	Obama	D	D	R
113	2013	Obama	D	D	R
113	2014	Obama	D	D	R
114	2015	Obama	D	R	R
114	2016	Obama	D	R	R
115	2017	Trump	R	R	R
115	2018	Trump	R	R	R
116	2019	Trump	R	R	D
116	2020	Trump	R	R	D
117	2021	Biden	D	D	D
117	2022	Biden	D	D	D
118	2023	Biden	D	D	R
118	2024	Biden	D	D	R

Between 1965 and 2022, divided government has been the dominant form, prevailing for 36 of the 58 years, with unified government in the remaining 22 years. In fact, the election of President Clinton ended the longest sustained period of divided government in the history of the Union. The 2022 election now adds two more years of divided government to that total—38 of 60 years (63%).

In *Federalist Paper* No. 47, James Madison wrote, “The accumulation of all power, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” Further, in *Federalist* No. 51, he wrote,

In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own... It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government.

In general, down through the generations, Americans have been wary of too much accumulation of power by any one group, be it political, economic, or social. This explains why divided government tends to be the rule, not the exception, within American politics.

On the one hand, divided government may mean more partisanship and gridlock, as there are ample examples of this in recent years. On the other hand, it can sometimes also result in major legislative accomplishments. In fact, Senator McConnell’s view, as expressed in a meeting with *New York Times* editors and reporters in 2011, is that divided government is a perfect time to do big things. This does, however, stand in contrast with the Republican approach during the Obama Administration when they worked to block almost all of President Obama’s agenda. We can expect the Republican majority in the House and Republican minority in the Senate to take a similar approach to the vast majority—if not all—of President Biden’s agenda during his next two years.

Legislative accomplishments, however, do occur in divided government, as seen with the analysis of Yale political scientist David Mayhew who carefully identified 267 important laws enacted by Congress between 1947 and 1990 to determine which periods were most productive. He found that under unified government, each two-year Congress enacted an average of 12.8 important laws. Under divided government, each Congress enacted only one fewer, 11.7, a figure understated by counting the sweeping budget and tax cuts of 1981 as just two laws. In the 1960s and early 1970s, for example, Congress passed numerous laws on civil rights, social policy and environmental protection. Much of this happened under two Republican presidents, Nixon and Ford, whose administrations were productive legislatively notwithstanding divided government. Then, during the 1980s, a conservative wave induced a Democratic Congress to go along with President Reagan on a series of major policy changes in a more conservative direction:

- Overhaul of Social Security in 1983 negotiated by President Ronald Reagan and Speaker Tip O’Neil.

- Changes to the tax law enacted in 1986 (Reagan was president; Democrats still controlled the House).
- Domestic spending reductions and a defense build-up in the 1980s under divided government with Reagan and a Democratic Congress.

Democrats had near solid control of both houses of Congress since Franklin Roosevelt's election in 1933.¹ That trend was broken by Republican's capture of the Senate for the first time since 1955 when Reagan was elected president in 1980. Democrats' hold on the House would only be broken in 1995.

When President Clinton assumed the Presidency, he had a unified government for two years but lost it for the remaining six years of his serving in office. Yet, it was in 1996 under divided government (Republicans controlled both Houses of Congress) that he reached a major welfare reform agreement with Congress.

And while in the first two years of his administration, President Biden and the Democratic Congress have been particularly productive, they had notable bipartisan support on popular measures such as the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and the CHIPS and Science Act.

Major policy changes have occurred when national conditions or the public mood demanded them. They have not necessarily required a unified government. However, the last two decades have produced the least productive Congresses, as outlined below.

We are now entering another of these more common periods of divided government. It is difficult to determine precisely what the implications will mean as we are in a period where many of the traditional and conventional expectations and practices of both government and politics are themselves in flux. The 2016 presidential election and the subsequent Trump Administration realigned some traditional party positions, such as the Republican stance on deficit spending and free trade. A trend of increasing partisanship has only grown, and many members of the entering Congressional class are more hardline in their views than their predecessors. The outer edges of both parties have become both larger and more extreme.

One trend that will emerge is a clear shift of power from one end of Pennsylvania Avenue to the other. Any legislation that the president requests and any that reaches his desk will require support from majorities in both houses of Congress. With different parties controlling the chambers, Congress's bargaining power has increased. Unfortunately, there have been commensurate challenges in accomplishing some of the basic functions of government, as evidenced by the difficulty of passing authorization

¹ With the exception of the 80th and 83rd Congresses.

bills (other than defense) and the prolonged reliance on continuing resolutions (CR) for the last 26 years. Given all of this turbulence, the record from divided governments of the past provides needed insight on national security in the future.

Historical Trends in Defense Policy

In the specific domain of national security, Congress’s roles can be defined within three broad categories: budgetary decisions, strategic policies, and war powers. The budgetary role of Congress relates to its constitutionally enumerated responsibility for the allocation of appropriated resources that allows it to raise armies, maintain a navy, and provide the rules and governance thereof. But this role, by nature, extends into such areas as military facilities and base infrastructure, weapons procurement, and personnel policies. Strategic policy has more to do with strategy reviews to answer the question of what our national military objectives should be and what it will cost to achieve them. It includes the administration’s approach to defense and foreign policy. Congress also has the sole power to declare war—which it has not exercised since World War II. Congress has largely ceded this authority to the executive branch, which has used its authority to send troops abroad on numerous occasions in that same timeframe. In some circumstances, Congressional authorization was provided via resolutions, such as in the first Gulf War, and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) post 9/11.

In the past, Democrats and Republicans have differed in their approaches to each of these three areas. Going back to the Nixon Administration, several trends emerge on defense policy in divided government.

Defense Appropriations Averages, FY1950-2022 (in millions)*					
Admin	House	Senate	House vs. Request	Senate vs. Request	Total vs. Request
R	R	R	(\$543)	(\$1,795)	\$1,508
D	D	D	(\$1,145)	(\$1,011)	\$382
R	D	R	(\$9,199)	(\$4,411)	(\$6,306)
R	D		(\$6,580)	(\$4,290)	(\$4,531)
D			(\$1,991)	(\$2,933)	(\$2,064)
	D		(\$4,506)	(\$3,103)	(\$2,723)
		D	(\$3,672)	(\$3,482)	(\$3,346)
R			(\$5,071)	(\$3,666)	(\$3,021)
	R		(\$1,875)	(\$3,880)	(\$2,309)
		R	(\$3,558)	(\$2,990)	(\$1,189)
D	R		(\$2,984)	(\$5,617)	(\$5,489)
D		R	(\$1,364)	(\$2,558)	\$1,126

*This chart shows the average differences between the president’s budget request, the House and Senate appropriations bills, and the final bill during different periods of unified and divided government. The 4th column, for example, represents all years of a Republican administration and a Democratic House, regardless of Senate control. The 5th column represents all years of Democratic administrations, regardless of Senate or House

As a general trend, Democratic majorities—especially in the House—have supported lower defense spending than requested by Republican administrations, though the final passed budget has usually been closer to the Senate number than the House.² In FY1970, President Nixon’s first year in office, Congress authorized the largest defense cuts since 1954. Nixon had proposed a \$2.5 billion cut from Johnson’s original budget, while the House passed \$5.3 billion in cuts. The final budget for FY70 was \$5.6 billion below the Nixon request, despite the still ongoing Vietnam War. In FY1976, a Democratic Congress further lowered defense spending by \$7.4 billion below the requested level, even despite Secretary of Defense Schlesinger’s strong warning that it would put US forces at a disadvantage against the Soviet Union.

The Reagan era saw the largest difference between administration requests and passed budgets. Between FY1984 and FY1988, the passed budget was, on average, \$18.6 billion lower than the administration request, with the largest cut in FY87 of \$25 billion. It is important to note that during this time, year over year growth was still increasing—just at a lower pace than the Reagan Administration requested. Despite the reductions, the Reagan build-up is still referred to in glowing terms—though few remember a number of his budget requests were not approved. Democrats were increasingly concerned with growing defense budgets in the face of growing deficits and Reagan’s unwillingness to raise taxes or boost domestic spending.

In FY1991, a Democratic Congress enacted a \$17 billion budget cut from the previous year—\$18.3 billion below President Bush’s request—as a result of the end of the Cold War and a signal to the administration that it needed to change its defense strategy.

In terms of specific programs and policies, arms control and nuclear issues, major weapons systems, social and environmental issues, strong oversight, and differing views overseas operations have been major areas of tension between Republicans and Democrats.

Nuclear weapons have always been a contentious topic between the two parties. Republicans, in general, have supported weapons and tended to distrust arms control efforts, while Democrats have been much the opposite. Between FY1971 and FY76, Congress restricted Nixon and Ford’s anti-ballistic missile expansion plans and pushed back on the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) missiles. This trend was especially evident during the Reagan Administration, when Democrats were skeptical of Reagan’s commitment to arms control. The House voted multiple times and actually passed a symbolic nuclear arms freeze in 1983. There was also strong opposition to Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, MX missiles, and anti-satellite (ASAT) missile development, with Congress seeking to limit funding to all those

² For a complete list of appropriations requests and bills for defense from 1950-2019, see Appendix 1.

programs throughout his administration, though elements of all were appropriated at lower levels.

Democrats also tended to be more skeptical of major weapons systems, mostly due to massive cost overruns. They were skeptical of building additional nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in 1970 and in FY1977 the House rejected the administration's plan to build six new warships to counter the Soviets. In the late 1970s, a number of the more liberal members attacked the Army's Big Five programs but these were fully supported by large bipartisan majorities. During the Reagan years, Democrats charged that Reagan was sacrificing readiness (ammunition and training time) for major weapons systems, and made procurement their biggest target for finding DOD savings. Some Democrats pushed back on the B-2 bomber and only 20 were purchased on Secretary of Defense Cheney's recommendation.

Democrats and Republicans have also strongly upheld the Armed Services Committees' tradition of oversight of the Pentagon, specifically on the issues of cost overruns and headquarters staff and personnel policies. Beginning in 1974, Congress demanded stronger oversight of CIA activities, resulting in the Church Committee and Pike Committee's major investigations into the intelligence community in 1975. This resulted in the shift of intelligence oversight from the defense committees to the newly created intelligence committees. 1983 saw the beginning of stronger procurement oversight of DOD that led to the Packard Commission and its acquisition reforms. Democratic Reps. Jack Brooks and John Dingell also launched aggressive oversight investigations into the Pentagon from the House Government Operations and Energy and Commerce Committees, respectively. Strong oversight of the Pentagon within the committees of jurisdiction is, however, a bipartisan issue, with both Democrats and Republicans leading investigations into the executive branch—regardless of party in power—throughout the years. These included Desert One, the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing, academy and recruiting scandals, the *Iowa* explosion, Somalia, Panama, Grenada, and many more. The Pentagon should expect the same level of scrutiny with the new Congress, including from outside the traditional defense committees. Republicans have already indicated that they are going to start a number of new investigations, such as the Afghanistan withdrawal.³

In line with their domestic agendas, Democrats try to pass more social and environmental changes affecting the Defense Department. In 1974, a Democratic Congress successfully overrode President Ford's veto of H.R.12628 expanding vocational and education benefits for Vietnam veterans. In 2008, a Democratic Congress passed the largest expansion of the GI Bill since WWII in that year's Overseas Contingency Operations funding bill. Several other social issues championed

³ During my tenure as staff director, Sen. Nunn as Chairman worked with the HASC, unsuccessfully, to restrain the House non-jurisdictional committees from investigating the Pentagon.

by Democrats included opening combat roles to women beginning in 1991 and Don't Ask, Don't Tell and its repeal.⁴ Democrats have also sought to ensure that DOD is a responsible steward of the environment, such as with the 1986 Defense Environmental Restoration Program and with several environmental cleanup issues passed in FY1991. We can expect a Republican House to try to pass issues that are important to their base, such as abortion restrictions for servicemembers and veterans, and investigating the DOD's handling of white nationalism in the troops.

Another major area of contention has been Congressional opposition to overseas operations, showing Congress's enduring but partial interest in its war powers authority. In 1973, Congress overrode Nixon's veto of H.J.Res. 542 to limit the president's powers to commit US forces abroad without Congressional approval. The War Power Act has been a continuing source of tension between the legislative and executive branches ever since. During the Vietnam War, Congress sought to limit in scope the Nixon Administration's actions, including a ban on ground troops in Laos and Thailand in FY70, limits on aid to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in FY71, and reductions in foreign aid to Vietnam and reduction in troops overseas in FY75. Democrats were also opposed to a large troop presence in Europe after the end of the Cold War. And though both authorizations ultimately passed, many Democrats voted against the Persian Gulf War resolution in 1991 and the Iraq War resolution in 2003. In 2007, Democrats opposed Iraq and Afghanistan funding unless it was accompanied by policy changes and withdrawal dates from the Bush Administration. During the Trump administration, Democrats and Republicans passed resolutions to limit President Trump's ability to use force without Congress's approval—specifically in Iran and Yemen—but both were vetoed by the President. During the Trump administration, Republicans became more reluctant to get involved in overseas operations with their "America First" agenda. A number of Republicans have expressed opposition to continuing to fund Ukraine's defense against Russia's invasion.

We can expect some of these policy differences to continue in the new 118th Congress, with China, military recruitment, and oversight being the major areas. However, the HASC, SASC, HAC-D, and SAC-D have always operated in a bipartisan approach, and we should expect this to continue.

The Use of Presidential Vetoes in Divided and Unified Governments

One of the strongest levers of powers possessed by the president is the veto. Before using it, the White House usually tries to determine whether or not enough votes can be mustered to sustain a veto, either 146 votes in the House or 34 votes in the Senate.⁵

⁴ Both DADT and its repeal were passed in unified Democratic government.

⁵ These numbers are one third plus one and assume all Members vote on the override.

In signaling to Congress its displeasure with a bill, the White House uses three gradations of veto threats, (1) The strongest veto threat being that the “president will veto the bill if passed.” (2) The intermediate threat is that “the president’s senior advisors” or “the president’s advisors” will recommend a veto. (3) The weakest form of a veto threat is that one or more “Cabinet Secretaries will recommend a veto.” The Executive Branch signals these threats to the Congress both informally through the White House Legislative Affairs Office and through formal communications known as Statements of Administration Policy (SAP). After the issuance of one of these SAPs, behind-the-scenes discussions take place to see if offending provisions can be modified or changed before its passage. If not, the Constitution requires that the president return a vetoed bill to the Congress within ten days of its receipt at the White House with an explanation of his objections in a veto message. If the veto threat is not at the presidential level, it is often the case that the president ultimately signs the bill but, again, the White House Legislative Office works with Congress to make the objectionable provisions more acceptable. Often, the Cabinet Secretary and the White House closely coordinate on these efforts. While presidents have succeeded in vetoing certain provisions out of bills, they cannot veto provisions into bills.

If Congress has adjourned, a president may “pocket veto” a bill because he cannot return it to Congress. In recent administrations, this has rarely happened.

Recent presidents have generally been able to sustain their vetoes, which makes the veto threat an effective tool. Between the Kennedy and Trump Administrations (1961 to 2021) there were 384 vetoes but only 39 successful overrides by Congress.⁶

Appropriations bills have been vetoed 43 times since 1960, with four of those vetoes overridden. Though several of these vetoes were continuing resolutions that would have included defense funding, the Defense Appropriations Bill itself has not been vetoed. The White House has only vetoed the National Defense Authorization Bill six times since 1961, the most recent being in 2020 during the Trump Administration. Not all six vetoes occurred during periods of divided government. President Carter vetoed the defense authorization bill for FY1979 that the Democratic Congress sent to the White House (H.R. 10929) because he objected to the bill's authorization of almost \$2 billion for a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. After the House sustained the veto, the Congress passed a second FY1979 authorization bill that did not authorize funding for the carrier and the president signed the bill into law on October 20, 1978.

President Reagan vetoed the FY1989 NDAA (H.R. 4264) over Congress’s cuts to his Strategic Defense Initiative program, ballistic missile submarines, and ICBM modernization programs. He described these cuts as “unilateral concessions on arms

⁶ The following link provides a complete historical listing of presidential vetoes and overrides by Congress: <https://www.senate.gov/reference/Legislation/Vetoes/vetoCounts.htm>

control [to the Soviet Union].” Almost two months later, Reagan signed the updated NDAA (H.R. 4481) with those provisions removed.

In the case of the bill vetoed by the Obama Administration in 2015, the NDAA (H.R. 1735) would have authorized essentially the total amount requested by the president for defense-related spending but without changing the current budget caps. The bill would have avoided breaking the cap on defense base budget spending by shifting roughly \$38 billion of the total requested for the defense base budget into the OCO budget, which is exempt from the budget caps. The president objected to lifting effectively the spending cap on defense without providing the same degree of relief for nondefense discretionary spending and, accordingly, vetoed H.R. 1735.

The impasse was resolved by the enactment on November 2, 2015, of P.L. 114-74, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA). It raised the discretionary spending caps for both defense and nondefense programs in FY16 and FY17, and also set nonbinding “targets” for discretionary OCO appropriations in both the defense and nondefense categories, the latter falling within the budget function for international relations. The OCO target cap for defense exceeded the president’s defense-related OCO budget request by \$7.9 billion. Thus, the net effect of this was to allow (within the revised budget caps for FY16) total defense-related discretionary appropriations amounting to \$606.9 billion, which was \$5.0 billion less than the president requested (counting both base budget and OCO funding).

President Trump’s veto of the FY21 NDAA in December 2020 was mostly the result of his displeasure that the bill excluded a provision to modify the liability shield for big tech companies. The legislation—Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act—was not within the jurisdiction of the defense committees, not included in either the House or Senate versions of the bill. Trump also opposed provisions to rename military bases named after Confederate generals and limit the withdrawal of troops from overseas without Congressional approval. The Trump veto was the first time a veto of the NDAA was overridden by Congress (a Democratic House and a Republican Senate), resulting in none of the president’s objections being addressed.

In sum, for five of the six vetoed defense authorization bills, Congress passed replacement bills either with or without modified provisions that had previously been veto issues, and the president signed them despite the fact that the veto did not convince Congress to add provisions he had requested. This reflects how committed the defense authorization committees and the Pentagon are to making sure they get a bill enacted every other year. Many other agencies do not consistently receive an annual authorization bill the way defense does—during periods of both unified and divided governments.

The Current Congressional Environment

By any measure, the current congressional environment on Capitol Hill is contentious. By even the most generous assessments, it is certainly different from the traditional relationships the department enjoyed through the Cold War and into the early years of the 21st century.

Dr. Tom Mann and Dr. Norm Ornstein (who occupy very different positions on the political spectrum), argue in their 2006 book *The Broken Branch* that the problems with Congress escalated with the “collapse of the center in Congress, the growing polarization of the parties, and the decline in accountability... contributed to a climate on Capitol Hill that we found unsettling and destructive.”⁷ Mann and Ornstein noted that although many may argue Congress has actually changed little, “to grizzled veterans like us, with more than thirty-five years of Congress-watching, the differences are palpable and painful. Taken together, they have made for a broken branch, one that needs major change if it is to recapture its proper role in the constitutional system.” In *It’s Even Worse Than It Looks*, written in 2012, Mann and Ornstein argued that both political parties had become quite extreme in their views and adversarial in their approach to politics and governing. There is little evidence from the last 10 years to suggest they would change their assessments.

This condition described by Mann and Ornstein, combined paradoxically with increased party fractiousness, and enhanced by the weakened positions of senior Congressional leadership that began as far back as the post-Watergate period, has resulted in a contemporary Congress where power is widely dispersed, unevenly applied, and more influenced by internal caucuses and outside groups than in previous eras.

Where party leaders in both houses and committee chairmen once wielded enormous power allowing for issue resolution by a small number of people, today numerous power sources must be considered—especially in the House of Representatives where recent Speakers, Boehner, Ryan, and Pelosi have constantly struggled to control their own conference on certain issues. The slim majorities of the 118th Congress will mean that leaders will have an even harder time keeping their conferences in line.

The challenge this presents is that issues now must be adjudicated with numerous members (and staff), some of them not even members of appropriate committees of jurisdiction. In short, a function that has always been hard, and fraught with downsides, is now even more so. This is made even worse by the increasing partisanship within our country, reflected in the members they send to Congress. There are major differences

⁷ Dr. Tom Mann (Brookings) and Dr. Norm Ornstein (American Enterprise Institute) have co-authored two books on the topic: *The Broken Branch: How Congress is Failing America and How to Get It Back on Track* (Oxford Press, 2006), and *It’s Even Worse Than You Think: How the American Constitutional System Collided With the New Politics of Extremism* (Basic Books, 2012):

even within parties—from arguments on deficit spending and trade wars on the Republican side to the scope of government’s role in society on the Democratic side—that make it more difficult to reach agreements now than in the past. For defense, this enhances the need to remain as bipartisan in approach as possible to avoid being politicized and dragged into partisan food fights.

While the SASC, HASC, SAC-D, and HAC-D remain fairly bipartisan in their approach, the three basic processes in Congress; budget, authorization, and appropriation, are currently badly bent, if not broken. While the Authorization Committees continue to pass the annual defense authorization bill since first established by Sen. Richard Russell in 1959, in recent times it is hardly ever done in time to guide the appropriations process (of course, most appropriations committees outside of defense seldom have authorization bills to guide them), or passed prior to the beginning of the fiscal year. In recent years, no Senate version cleared the upper chamber, so the conference report relied on only the Senate Armed Services Committee approved version. The authorization bill in its early years was five pages of bill language and four pages of report language; the FY22 Senate bill was 910 pages and the House report was 613 pages. The final bill and report were 1,537 pages.

The budget process, which is supposed to set overall spending and revenue totals with an agreed concurrent budget resolution, has failed at least eight times in the past twelve years. This means there has been no agreed budget to guide the spending process. The last time all twelve appropriations bills were passed by the start of the fiscal year was in 1996 (FY1997). The fiscal year has started with a continuing resolution (CR) for 26 straight years, with a notable exception that FY19’s CR covered only 13% of discretionary spending, while the remaining 87% of spending had a full-year appropriation, including defense.

Sixty votes are required in the Senate to pass authorization and appropriation bills, and there is no “nuclear option” or reconciliation procedure to bypass this requirement. For example, it is highly unlikely the Democratic leadership in the Senate will agree to increased spending on defense absent some “deal” on domestic spending no matter who controls the Senate.

The outside lobby groups, from veterans-based (American Legion, VFW, Iraq & Afghanistan vets) to service-based (AUSA, Navy League, AFA, Marine Corps League, NGAUS) to industry (NDIA, AIA, PSC) to benefits-based (MOAA, military associations) have demonstrated a far greater ability to shape legislation—contrary to Pentagon wishes—than in previous eras. Some associations have shifted their approach from pushing for a strong national defense to advocating more benefits for their members, whether it is a policy shift, or a higher benefit, or blocking DOD’s requested reforms. A former Deputy Secretary of Defense has summed up this shift as follows: The slogan has changed from “praise the lord and pass the ammunition” to “praise the lord and

pass the benefits.” The individual defense companies’ lobbying expenditures (and political contributions) are at an all-time high and the Congress has developed “work arounds” to the “ban” on earmarks. Multiple attempts at requested Pentagon reforms have been blocked in the Congress.

It is within this difficult reality that DOD must adapt in its approach. Despite the current climate, however, Congress has always been the nexus of disagreements, arguments and, ultimately, compromises and governing. While this current period may seem more extreme than before, it is important to view it in historical context. The Pentagon leadership working with the defense committees of jurisdiction have passed the authorization and appropriation bills each year.

Emerging Differences between Democrats and Republicans on Defense Policy and Programs in a New Congress

While continuing to support the many areas where there is bipartisan agreement, Republicans are likely to focus on a number of areas of high interest and some disagreements in the new Congress, including addressing the threat from China and protecting Taiwan, improving military recruitment, greater oversight of the Biden administration, challenging elements of the National Defense Strategy, and the climate agenda.

On China, Republicans are mostly in line with Democrats on the need for modernization throughout the Department (including nuclear modernization), shoring up supply chains and the defense industrial base, reforming the Pentagon to ensure we are getting the most bang for the buck, and strengthening support for Taiwan. Republicans have even promised to form a Select Committee on China.

The military is in the midst of a recruitment crisis, and Republicans have pinned part of the blame on what they call “woke” military policies—policies that promote diversity and gender equity and root out extremist and white nationalist views in the troops.

Alongside investigating DOD’s recruitment struggles and personnel policies, Republicans have planned additional areas for oversight of DOD. The top item on that list is the Biden administration’s Afghanistan withdrawal, which they view as botched, and examining the rationale and decision-making process within the DOD and the broader national security apparatus that led to the withdrawal. Republicans could attack career military leaders directly on this issue, but will definitely seek to identify and exploit—on a public stage—areas in which complex decisions made by civilian leaders resulted in failure. To this end, Republicans will seek to highlight the often marked divergence between military advice rendered and civilian decisions taken.

Additional items on Republicans’ oversight agenda include Iran and the risks of a renegotiated nuclear deal and the impact of inflation on troops and their families. They

will question the concept of “integrated deterrence” and the approach of “divest to invest.”

An isolationist wing of the Republican party may continue to advance former President Trump’s “America First” foreign policy agenda of decreasing international engagements and foreign military aid. For example, a number of Republicans, including House GOP Leader Kevin McCarthy, have expressed skepticism of future funding for Ukraine, with McCarthy stating that Republicans will not write a “blank check” to Ukraine’s defense and Rep. Michael McCaul stating that he would lead oversight efforts over how Ukraine aid is spent. Other Republicans, such as Republican Senate Leader Mitch McConnell, however, have sought to reassure allies that support for Ukraine will remain a bipartisan issue.

This is a signal that Republican deficit hawks will lose their “amnesia” they acquired during the Trump administration and return to their roots of big budget skepticism, especially in the midst of high inflation and a potential recession. This previews possible tensions between the deficit and defense hawks in the Republican party moving forward, with defense hawks pushing for higher defense spending (SASC Ranking Member Inhofe is pushing for at least a 5% increase over inflation each year, and his successor, Sen. Roger Wicker, is in that same ballpark) and deficit hawks pushing for across the board budget cuts. In past years in a Republican controlled House, the deficit hawks, coupled with the anti-defense Democrats, were able to defeat defense increases.

An additional area of importance to the administration is the confirmation process in the Senate. With 61 Presidential appointment with Senate confirmation (PAS) positions in the Department of Defense, as well as military leaders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Combatant Commanders, the Senate has a decent amount of leverage over the Department when it comes to its advice and consent role. Since Democrats retained their Senate majority, the Biden administration will have an easier time filling vacancies, albeit at the slower pace we have seen in recent years.

What Divided Government would mean for the Defense Topline

Given our politically-divided country at the moment, divided government may well lead to more partisanship and gridlock, particularly on domestic priorities. But, will defense be hurt by such an electoral outcome? For example, what does divided government mean for the defense topline? Probably not as much as one would think. Previous periods of divided government show that both the president and Congress have ultimately worked together when it came to how much money to spend on defense, even though they would communicate and advertise their policy differences up to the last moment.


- Reagan submitted requests to Congress (Future Years' Defense Plans or FYDPs) showing higher defense growth than appropriated by Congress. Yet, Reagan signed the lower appropriations bills, which in some cases were significantly lower than he requested. In the six years where there was a Republican Administration, a Republican Senate, and a Democratic House the defense base budget increased an average of \$25B per year. The defense base budget could similarly increase as the initiatives to move OCO to base were approved in FY20 and later years. During the same six-year period, the average amount appropriated for defense was \$8.7B lower than the amount requested (or -3.9%), with the Senate level being \$5.6B lower and the House level being \$11.5B lower. Final appropriations were delayed an average 68 days from the beginning of the fiscal year (ranging from a low of 12 days to a high of 90 days).
- In the 1990s, the Clinton administration repeatedly projected lower defense spending in its FYDPs than Congress ultimately appropriated. But, President Clinton signed the appropriations bills.
- Similarly, the Obama administration repeatedly projected higher defense budget requests than appropriated by Congress—even with a Republican House and Senate—which adhered to the Budget Control Act (BCA) and the caps it placed on the defense budget. Yet again, the Obama Administration signed those bills. The president's primary policy concern, expressed in his veto, was that domestic priorities had to be treated on par with defense if increases above the spending caps were authorized.
- And though in a period of unified government, the Biden administration signed the FY22 defense appropriation that was much higher than their request, and the FY23 levels in three of the four defense bills are much higher than the request. Biden is expected to sign the FY23 bill without issues as well.

The pattern of accommodation suggested above may be because the spending differences between the Executive and Congress were never of such significant magnitude to merit bigger political fights. Also, getting defense money appropriated and available for obligation always becomes the imperative due to its ties to national security and the significant number of government, civilian, and contractor jobs provided.

So, what might happen to the defense topline after the new Congress is sworn in? The first key question that must be answered is what will be the final appropriated amount for FY23. Defense spending levels are still not yet finalized for FY23 but there are indications as to prospective outcomes based on legislation to date. Both the House and Senate have released their versions of the National Defense Authorization Act that includes authorized spending levels, and both the House and Senate have released their versions of their Defense Appropriations bill (and Military Construction/Veterans Affairs). The House version of prospective legislation for DOD is at a funding level

equivalent to the administration's request, while all other three authorization and appropriation bill drafts are above both the FY22 enacted levels and the FY23 requested levels. The increase over FY22 levels ranges from a low of 4.7% to a high of 10.3%. The House NDAA and Senate appropriation are very close with a funding total of \$808B for DOD, which is our consensus estimate for FY23's outcome. The traditional appropriations leadership will want to clear the deck and pass an omnibus in the lame duck; however, there is always a possibility that there will be a series of short term CRs that ultimately extend the current CR into as far as April/May, as was the case after the 2010 midterm elections for the FY2011 budget year (in that year the Republicans took back control of the House and Senate Democrats lost 6 seats but maintained a majority of 51 seats). The scenarios for future year budgets at this time include the following:

- (1) Requested Levels: Assumes that the current administration abides by their existing plans regardless of any changes to party control during the midterm elections, and keeps the latest requested levels for future years from their FY23 request unchanged.
- (2) Republican House and Senate: Assumes that the historical averages of a Republican House and Senate increasing a Democratic administration's requested levels by \$1 billion per year apply to the existing FYDP in the FY23 request.
- (3) Adjust for Inflation: Assumes that Congress will take action to increase budgets at the rate of inflation over the administration's requested levels. The FY22 annual inflation rate fell in the 8% range which is used for FY24's annual increase over the expected FY23 result, decreasing to 6% in FY25, and lowering to 4% per year for FY26 and FY27.
- (4) Fiscal Constraint: Assumes that a similar pattern of defense spending in future years will occur, as was the case after the 2010 midterm election. During that period, concerns with the debt and deficit rose to the forefront and began to drive funding levels. Both 2011 and 2012 budgets increased, but then decreases began to occur as a result of the Budget Control Act and sequester legislation that forced budget reductions.



*FY22 Budget shifts OCO funding to base budget


** FY23 budget level estimated based on lower end of Senate draft appropriations

*** Average increase of \$1B over administration's requested annual increase request

The bottom line for defense base budget funding projections will be dependent on how the new Congress reacts to the administration’s budget request that hopefully will be released in February 2023. As the appropriations process continues through the summer months the ongoing negotiations will provide the necessary insight to determine the stated priorities that will be acted upon and those that fall to the wayside as just talking points. Note that the budget scenarios do not include any defense related emergency spending increases, such as has been the case with supplemental/emergency funding for Ukraine since Russia’s invasion. DOD’s leadership has made it clear that Ukraine funding should not be part of the DOD base budget.

The fiscal constraint scenario should not be simply disregarded as improbable. Concerns over the debt and deficits are real. The Congressional Budget Office’s recent long term budget projections show that under current law, federal debt held by the public will rise from 98% of GDP at the end of FY22 to a record 107% by 2031 and to 185% by 2052. For context, the 50-year average of debt held by the public is 46% of GDP. In nominal dollars, debt will grow by \$114 trillion, from \$24 trillion today to \$138 trillion in 2052. Debt and deficits could be significantly higher with alternative policy assumptions. Under CBO’s costly alternative scenario – where revenue and discretionary spending return to their historic averages – debt would rise to 262% of GDP by FY2052 and the deficit would total 18.2% of GDP. The chart that follows shows the unsustainable trend lines.

Fig. 1: Federal Debt Held by the Public, FY 2012-2052 (Percent of GDP)



Source: Congressional Budget Office.

During the mid-1980s, when deficits were believed to be out of control, Congress passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget Act, which included control mechanisms to keep spending deficit neutral. This was also the Republican House position during all of the Obama Administration. We now have deficits that dwarf the conditions for GRH, and the House Freedom Caucus is likely to return to its roots and lose their amnesia on deficits they acquired during the Trump budget years. Any deal they would support is unlikely to get Democratic support in the House, or get to a sixty-vote margin in the Senate. While there is some speculation that the Republicans will push for a “sequester” approach, it is hard to imagine the Senate would be able to garner a 60 vote majority or that the president would sign such an agreement. The state of the economy and public sentiment related to government spending over the next two years preceding the next presidential election, however, could drive a bipartisan majority into taking a fiscal constraint course of action over the course of the 5-year horizon.

It is also worth noting, though, that in 2019 HASC Chairman Adam Smith expressed skepticism of the high defense budget in FY20 (\$716 billion) due to the increasing debt and deficit, but Democratic majorities in the House and Senate still have, on a wide bipartisan basis, added huge sums to the Biden administration’s FY22 request for defense, totaling over \$26 billion. FY23 is likely to be close to the HASC/SAC-D level, which is about 9% higher than the FY23 request, which itself was \$20 billion higher than the previous estimate. This is a considerable testament to the bipartisan support of a strong national defense, as well as Pentagon leadership.

Despite all of these complicating factors, when all is said and done in the appropriations conference between the House and Senate, and in communications with the Administration, an agreement on funding—while more difficult to achieve than in the first

two years of the Biden Administration—will occur. The majority of the Congressional body politic understand that a functioning government is better than a non-functioning one. A veto of an appropriations bill is unlikely, though not impossible. Though there have been big increases for defense over the last two years and we expect another increase in FY23, the FYDP Greenbook projections are essentially flat over the next decade. The Congressional additions in the past will not be as simple in a divided government. Each proposed increase to defense will have to compete with other priorities for non-national defense programs. It is unrealistic to assume that growth will continue at the 8% rate through all the years of the FYDP.

How should the Secretary of Defense Respond to Divided Government?

On a positive note, while the recent election suggests a nation that is still sharply divided, it is not divided by any “anti-defense” sentiment, as was seen in the 1970s. Observers then noted that “both the disillusionment with the ‘imperial presidency’ and the anti-defense mood of the country after Vietnam pushed Congress into ever more detailed scrutiny.”⁸ Indeed, if anything, given the strains and sacrifices demanded of the military during the past 21 years, the favorable status of the military based on performance and results (albeit trust in the military has dropped) makes defense and defense spending less controversial than it has been in the past. A Democratic Congress in the first two years of the Biden administration cut \$2 billion from the budget request in FY21 and added \$26 billion in FY22. However, deciding on necessary defense spending levels and determining where cuts must be made elsewhere will still involve a spirited debate.

The role of the Secretary becomes more important in this environment, especially building or maintaining relationships across the aisle with new authorization and appropriations committee heads. Taking a constructive and pragmatic approach to policy discussions on the Hill should further cement such relationships. While not undermining the White House, the Secretary’s relationships can serve in a critical way to move the process along, be it appropriations or authorization bills or policy issues before other committees. The Secretary can help to serve as a linkage between Congressional committees, White House legislative affairs, and the National Security Council when they might have equity in a particular issue. The White House tends to have more relationships at a very senior level in Congress as opposed to Committees, where the Secretary can play the major role. If the White House tends to be more ideological or partisan, the Secretary can and should play the role of broker to ensure that national security equities are understood and acceptably met. For example, in cases of veto threats from the White House, the Secretary can play an important role in helping resolve issues with the bill so that the cause for the threat is removed. Or, if the

⁸ Robert J. Art, “Congress and the Defense Budget: Enhancing Policy Options, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol 100, No. 2, Summer 1985, p. 232.

veto does occur, they can work with Congress and the White House on a new bill that resolves the issues. Additionally, the Secretary will have a slightly easier time working with the Senate to confirm DOD nominees in a timely manner—an important task as we begin to see turnover in senior civilian leaders at the midpoint of Biden’s first term, along with upcoming changeovers in the military leadership, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Finally, the Secretary must first and foremost be an advocate for DOD’s equities, while recognizing the principle that domestic and defense spending are linked, as has been reflected in previous statutory changes to the caps. The Secretary should also ensure an advantageous relationship with the new Congress, and closely coordinate with both the Chairmen and Ranking Members in the Congress. History also shows the stronger conference position is one that has both the SASC and Senate support.

Appendix 1: Defense Appropriations – Request vs. House vs. Senate vs. Actuals (In thousands \$)

Fiscal Year	Budget Estimates	Approved by House	Approved by Senate	Appropriation	YoY Actual Chg	House v. Req	Senate v. Req	Actual v. Req	Congress	POTUS	Admin	House	Senate
1950	\$13,248,960	\$13,272,815	\$12,731,834	\$12,949,562	N/A	\$23,855	(\$517,126)	(\$299,398)	81	Truman	D	D	D
1951	\$13,078,675	\$12,910,702	\$13,294,581	\$13,294,299	\$344,737	(\$167,973)	\$215,906	\$215,624	82	Truman	D	D	D
1952	\$57,679,625	\$56,034,717	\$61,103,856	\$56,939,568	\$43,645,269	(\$1,644,908)	\$3,424,231	(\$740,057)	82	Truman	D	D	D
1953	\$51,390,709	\$46,207,177	\$46,403,000	\$46,610,938	(\$10,328,630)	(\$5,183,532)	(\$4,987,709)	(\$4,779,771)	83	Eisenhower	R	R	R
1954	\$40,719,931	\$34,434,140	\$34,511,302	\$34,371,541	(\$12,239,397)	(\$6,285,791)	(\$6,208,629)	(\$6,348,390)	83	Eisenhower	R	R	R
1955	\$29,887,055	\$28,684,250	\$29,217,106	\$28,800,125	(\$5,571,416)	(\$1,202,805)	(\$669,949)	(\$1,086,930)	84	Eisenhower	R	D	D
1956	\$32,232,815	\$31,488,206	\$31,882,915	\$31,882,815	\$3,082,690	(\$744,609)	(\$349,900)	(\$350,000)	84	Eisenhower	R	D	D
1957	\$34,147,850	\$33,635,066	\$34,783,734	\$34,656,727	\$2,773,912	(\$512,784)	\$635,884	\$508,877	85	Eisenhower	R	D	D
1958	\$36,128,000	\$33,562,725	\$34,534,229	\$33,759,850	(\$896,877)	(\$2,565,275)	(\$1,593,771)	(\$2,368,150)	85	Eisenhower	R	D	D
1959	\$38,196,947	\$38,409,561	\$40,042,992	\$39,602,827	\$5,842,977	\$212,614	\$1,846,045	\$1,405,880	86	Eisenhower	R	D	D
1960	\$39,248,200	\$38,843,339	\$39,594,339	\$39,228,239	(\$374,588)	(\$404,861)	\$346,139	(\$19,961)	86	Eisenhower	R	D	D
1961	\$39,335,000	\$39,337,867	\$40,514,997	\$39,996,608	\$768,369	\$2,867	\$1,179,997	\$661,608	87	Kennedy	D	D	D
1962	\$42,942,345	\$42,711,105	\$46,848,292	\$46,662,556	\$6,665,948	(\$231,240)	\$3,905,947	\$3,720,211	87	Kennedy	D	D	D
1963	\$47,907,000	\$47,839,491	\$48,429,221	\$48,136,247	\$1,473,691	(\$67,509)	\$522,221	\$229,247	88	Johnson	D	D	D
1964	\$49,014,237	\$47,082,009	\$47,339,707	\$47,220,010	(\$916,237)	(\$1,932,228)	(\$1,674,530)	(\$1,794,227)	88	Johnson	D	D	D
1965	\$47,471,000	\$46,759,267	\$46,774,401	\$46,752,051	(\$467,959)	(\$711,733)	(\$696,599)	(\$718,949)	89	Johnson	D	D*	D*
1966	\$45,248,844	\$45,188,244	\$46,877,063	\$46,887,163	\$135,112	(\$60,600)	\$1,628,219	\$1,638,319	89	Johnson	D	D*	D*
1967	\$57,664,353	\$58,616,445	\$58,189,872	\$58,067,472	\$11,180,309	\$952,092	\$525,519	\$403,119	90	Johnson	D	D	D
1968	\$71,584,000	\$70,295,200	\$70,132,320	\$69,936,620	\$11,869,148	(\$1,288,800)	(\$1,451,680)	(\$1,647,380)	90	Johnson	D	D	D
1969	\$77,074,000	\$72,239,700	\$71,886,893	\$71,869,828	\$1,933,208	(\$4,834,300)	(\$5,187,107)	(\$5,204,172)	91	Nixon	R	D	D
1970	\$75,278,200	\$69,960,048	\$69,322,656	\$69,640,568	(\$2,229,260)	(\$5,318,152)	(\$5,955,544)	(\$5,637,632)	91	Nixon	R	D	D
1971	\$68,745,666	\$66,806,561	\$66,417,077	\$66,595,937	(\$3,044,631)	(\$1,939,105)	(\$2,328,589)	(\$2,149,729)	92	Nixon	R	D	D
1972	\$73,543,829	\$71,048,013	\$70,849,113	\$70,518,463	\$3,922,526	(\$2,495,816)	(\$2,694,716)	(\$3,025,366)	92	Nixon	R	D	D
1973	\$79,594,184	\$74,577,548	\$74,571,698	\$74,372,976	\$3,854,513	(\$5,016,636)	(\$5,022,486)	(\$5,221,208)	93	Nixon	R	D	D
1974	\$77,250,723	\$74,493,609	\$73,235,677	\$74,218,240	(\$154,736)	(\$2,757,114)	(\$4,015,046)	(\$3,032,483)	93	Nixon	R	D	D
1975	\$87,057,497	\$83,393,570	\$82,097,858	\$82,576,297	\$8,358,057	(\$3,663,927)	(\$4,959,639)	(\$4,481,200)	94	Ford	R	D*	D*
1976	\$97,857,849	\$90,219,045	\$90,721,789	\$90,466,961	\$7,890,664	(\$7,638,804)	(\$7,136,060)	(\$7,390,888)	94	Ford	R	D*	D*
1977	\$107,964,472	\$105,397,343	\$104,014,226	\$104,343,835	\$13,876,874	(\$2,567,129)	(\$3,950,246)	(\$3,620,637)	95	Carter	D	D*	D*
1978	\$113,877,280	\$110,328,208	\$110,063,680	\$109,752,800	\$5,408,965	(\$3,549,072)	(\$3,813,600)	(\$4,124,480)	95	Carter	D	D*	D*
1979	\$119,300,283	\$119,179,478	\$116,533,972	\$117,377,721	\$7,624,921	(\$120,805)	(\$2,766,311)	(\$1,922,562)	96	Carter	D	D	D
1980	\$132,320,565	\$129,601,290	\$131,655,290	\$130,981,290	\$13,603,569	(\$2,719,275)	(\$665,275)	(\$1,339,275)	96	Carter	D	D	D
1981	\$154,496,424	\$157,211,492	\$160,847,830	\$159,738,836	\$28,757,546	\$2,715,068	\$6,351,406	\$5,242,412	97	Reagan	R	R	D
1982	\$200,878,234	\$197,443,289	\$208,675,745	\$199,691,264	\$39,952,428	(\$3,434,945)	\$7,797,511	(\$1,186,970)	97	Reagan	R	R	D
1983	\$183,457,310	\$177,066,115	\$177,847,796	\$177,867,548	(\$21,823,716)	(\$6,391,195)	(\$5,609,514)	(\$5,589,762)	98	Reagan	R	R	D
1984	\$197,968,100	\$187,327,500	\$185,897,100	\$187,490,700	\$9,623,152	(\$10,640,600)	(\$12,071,000)	(\$10,477,400)	98	Reagan	R	R	D

Fiscal Year	Budget Estimates	Approved by House	Approved by Senate	Appropriation	YoY Actual Chg	House v. Req	Senate v. Req	Actual v. Req	Congress	POTUS	Admin	House	Senate
1985	\$292,221,823	\$268,291,632	\$278,112,105	\$274,398,173	#VALUE!	(\$23,930,191)	(\$14,109,718)	(\$17,823,650)	99	Reagan	R	R	D
1986	\$303,954,000	\$276,598,300	\$288,250,500	\$281,161,900	\$6,763,727	(\$27,355,700)	(\$15,703,500)	(\$22,792,100)	99	Reagan	R	R	D
1987	\$299,032,138	\$267,769,416	\$274,695,897	\$273,999,006	(\$7,162,894)	(\$31,262,722)	(\$24,336,241)	(\$25,033,132)	100	Reagan	R	D	D
1988	\$293,887,908	\$266,780,254	\$278,044,604	\$278,982,848	\$4,983,842	(\$27,107,654)	(\$15,843,304)	(\$14,905,060)	100	Reagan	R	D	D
1989	\$283,159,445	\$282,602,828	\$282,572,013	\$282,412,350	\$3,429,502	(\$556,617)	(\$587,432)	(\$747,095)	101	Bush I	R	D	D
1990	\$286,000,000	\$286,000,000	\$286,000,000	\$286,000,000	\$3,587,650	\$0	\$0	\$0	101	Bush I	R	D	D
1991	\$287,282,674	\$269,281,398	\$268,240,850	\$268,981,467	(\$17,018,533)	(\$18,001,276)	(\$19,041,824)	(\$18,301,207)	102	Bush I	R	D	D
1992	\$270,936,322	\$270,565,792	\$270,257,747	\$269,911,240	\$929,773	(\$370,530)	(\$678,575)	(\$1,025,082)	102	Bush I	R	D	D
1993	\$261,133,500	\$251,866,700	\$250,685,600	\$253,786,600	(\$16,124,640)	(\$9,266,800)	(\$10,447,900)	(\$7,346,900)	103	Clinton	D	D	D
1994	\$240,857,464	\$239,426,512	\$238,820,818	\$240,534,878	(\$13,251,722)	(\$1,430,952)	(\$2,036,646)	(\$322,586)	103	Clinton	D	D	D
1995	\$244,711,179	\$243,564,292	\$243,414,029	\$243,724,188	\$3,189,310	(\$1,146,887)	(\$1,297,150)	(\$986,991)	104	Clinton	D	R	R
1996	\$236,344,017	\$243,997,500	\$242,683,841	\$243,251,297	(\$472,891)	\$7,653,483	\$6,339,824	\$6,907,280	104	Clinton	D	R	R
1997	\$234,678,433	\$245,216,503	\$244,896,904	\$244,277,558	\$1,026,261	\$10,538,070	\$10,218,471	\$9,599,125	105	Clinton	D	R	R
1998	\$243,923,541	\$248,335,303	\$247,184,859	\$247,708,522	\$3,430,984	\$4,411,762	\$3,261,318	\$3,784,981	105	Clinton	D	R	R
1999	\$250,998,803	\$250,727,097	\$250,518,092	\$250,510,548	\$2,802,026	(\$271,706)	(\$480,711)	(\$488,255)	106	Clinton	D	R	R
2000	\$263,265,959	\$268,661,503	\$264,693,100	\$267,795,360	\$17,284,812	\$5,395,544	\$1,427,141	\$4,529,401	106	Clinton	D	R	R
2001	\$284,500,986	\$288,512,800	\$287,630,500	\$287,806,054	\$20,010,694	\$4,011,814	\$3,129,514	\$3,305,068	107	Bush II	R	R	D/R
2002	\$319,547,116	\$317,624,089	\$317,623,483	\$317,623,747	\$29,817,693	(\$1,923,027)	(\$1,923,633)	(\$1,923,369)	107	Bush II	R	R	R
2003	\$366,671,630	\$354,712,914	\$355,405,941	\$355,107,380	\$37,483,633	(\$11,958,716)	(\$11,265,689)	(\$11,564,250)	108	Bush II	R	R	R
2004	\$372,346,314	\$369,190,239	\$369,165,293	\$368,711,561	\$13,604,181	(\$3,156,075)	(\$3,181,021)	(\$3,634,753)	108	Bush II	R	R	R
2005	\$392,824,305	\$391,170,100	\$394,012,400	\$391,170,312	\$22,458,751	(\$1,654,205)	(\$8,811,905)	(\$1,653,993)	109	Bush II	R	R	R
2006	\$397,214,410	\$394,456,182	\$390,216,117	\$416,438,633	\$25,268,321	(\$2,758,228)	(\$6,998,293)	\$19,224,223	109	Bush II	R	R	R
2007	\$420,413,166	\$416,340,489	\$427,329,190	\$436,540,771	\$20,102,138	(\$4,072,677)	\$6,916,024	\$16,127,605	110	Bush II	R	D	D
2008	\$462,880,800	\$459,331,995	\$460,126,000	\$459,331,997	\$22,791,226	(\$3,548,805)	(\$2,754,800)	(\$3,548,803)	110	Bush II	R	D	D
2009	\$481,648,058	\$477,644,889	\$477,644,889	\$477,644,889	\$18,312,892	(\$4,003,169)	(\$4,003,169)	(\$4,003,169)	111	Obama	D	D	D
2010	\$501,090,900	\$497,590,900	\$497,593,900	\$497,670,300	\$20,025,411	(\$3,500,000)	(\$3,497,000)	(\$3,420,600)	111	Obama	D	D	D
2011	\$520,290,000	\$513,271,000	\$512,191,000	\$502,385,000	\$4,714,700	(\$7,019,000)	(\$8,099,000)	(\$17,905,000)	112	Obama	D	D	R
2012	\$531,902,000	\$519,775,000	\$502,774,500	\$507,896,000	\$5,511,000	(\$12,127,000)	(\$29,127,500)	(\$24,006,000)	112	Obama	D	D	R
2013	\$513,015,000	\$511,676,000	\$503,618,000	\$510,132,000	\$2,236,000	(\$1,339,000)	(\$9,397,000)	(\$2,883,000)	113	Obama	D	D	R
2014	\$510,149,500	\$505,737,800	\$509,839,791	\$480,066,600	(\$30,065,400)	(\$4,411,700)	(\$309,709)	(\$30,082,900)	113	Obama	D	D	R
2015	\$485,253,900	\$484,455,800	\$483,116,800	\$483,705,900	\$3,639,300	(\$798,100)	(\$2,137,100)	(\$1,548,000)	114	Obama	D	R	R
2016	\$520,770,000	\$484,077,000	\$482,973,400	\$507,978,000	\$24,272,100	(\$36,693,000)	(\$37,796,600)	(\$12,792,000)	114	Obama	D	R	R
2017	\$511,232,800	\$510,646,100	\$509,466,100	\$509,631,000	\$1,653,000	(\$586,700)	(\$1,766,700)	(\$1,601,800)	115	Trump	R	R	R
2018	\$558,214,400	\$582,274,500	\$582,274,500	\$582,274,500	\$72,643,500	\$24,060,100	\$24,060,100	\$24,060,100	115	Trump	R	R	R
2019	\$600,331,353	\$599,934,364	\$602,466,995	\$601,913,915	\$19,639,415	(\$396,989)	\$2,135,642	\$1,582,562	116	Trump	R	R	D
2020	\$618,817,822	\$614,657,233	\$614,737,185	\$619,410,537	\$17,496,622	(\$4,160,589)	(\$4,080,637)	\$592,715	116	Trump	R	R	D
2021	\$621,518,334	\$626,189,692	\$618,906,500	\$619,409,500	(\$1,037)	\$4,671,358	(\$2,611,834)	(\$2,108,834)	117	Biden	D	D	D
2022	\$706,197,170	\$705,939,000	\$705,947,170	\$732,248,724	\$112,839,224	(\$258,170)	(\$250,000)	\$26,051,554	117	Biden	D	D	D