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National Security in Divided Government

Executive Summary

- Divided government is the norm in recent history, not the exception. In the last 54 years, 34 years had at least one of the three bodies (president, House, Senate) led by the opposite party.
- Regardless of unified or divided government, the president still signed both a defense authorization bill and an appropriations bill that funded defense and intelligence activities into law each year. In all years, the defense committees operated in the main in their traditional bipartisan fashion. It should be recognized that a president can veto something out of a bill but hardly ever can veto something into a bill.
- The automatic sequester cuts are still in effect for FY20 and FY21 on defense and domestic discretionary spending. This unfortunately provides a strong default position for those who do not want to reach another bipartisan spending compromise.
- The deficits, interest on the debt, the apparent failure to spend domestic discretionary appropriated at the agreed levels, and the Freedom Caucus's cure of their deficit spending amnesia will add to the degree of difficulty in reaching a bipartisan budget compromise.
- With history as a guide, the Democratic majority in the House will likely set a lower defense topline than requested; curtail nuclear weapons programs; push social and environmental issues; fence troubled programs; provide generous pay, benefits, and pro-family programs; challenge any major organizational proposals; constrain ongoing operations while requiring real-time operational updates; and pursue arms control restrictions. They will likely also push provisions from previous mark-ups that failed on party-line votes. They will also recognize that there are not sixty votes in the Senate for party-line agreements on spending and policies, giving the Senate minority a strong bargaining position.
- The Senate will need to pass the highest defense topline possible with bipartisan support to offset the predictably lower House number. If the Senate does not agree on a bipartisan level of funding, the House will be less likely to compromise knowing a Republican Senate without sixty votes cannot prevail.
- The Secretary of Defense and the Department need to continue their pragmatic, bipartisan approach to deal with these new Congressional realities, just as the defense committees—despite predictable differences—will continue to operate in a bipartisan manner.

Punaro worked with the Senate Armed Services Committee for 24 years for Sen. Sam Nunn (D-GA), with 14 years as Staff Director or Minority Staff Director. During those 14 years, 12 were during divided government and 10 were with a Democratic House and Republican president. As staff director in that time frame, he helped develop a SASC/Senate approach to ensure a strong conference position and outcome to deal with the predictable House positions opposed by the administration. He also has extensive experience in uniform, in industry, in associations, and on DOD boards and commissions.

National Security in Divided Government

In the first two years of the Trump Administration, the Republican party has controlled the executive branch and both houses of the Congress. But as we view the results of the recent 2018 midterm election, one that saw the Democratic Party regain control of the House of Representatives for the first time since 2010, it is useful to consider what the implications might be for the US defense establishment and its supporting industrial base. Given the return of divided government, what does this mean for how government could work for the next two years? In particular, is there anything to be learned from past experience that would help Federal agencies and their leaders navigate successfully, especially in the national security field?

What History Tells us about Divided Government

Congress #	Year	Admin.	POTUS	Senate	House
89	1965	Johnson	D	D*	D*
89	1966	Johnson	D	D*	D*
90	1967	Johnson	D	D	D
90	1968	Johnson	D	D	D
91	1969	Nixon	R	D	D
91	1970	Nixon	R	D	D
92	1971	Nixon	R	D	D
92	1972	Nixon	R	D	D
93	1973	Nixon	R	D	D
93	1974	Nixon	R	D	D
94	1975	Ford	R	D*	D*
94	1976	Ford	R	D*	D*
95	1977	Carter	D	D*	D*
95	1978	Carter	D	D*	D*
96	1979	Carter	D	D	D
96	1980	Carter	D	D	D
97	1981	Reagan	R	R	D
97	1982	Reagan	R	R	D
98	1983	Reagan	R	R	D
98	1984	Reagan	R	R	D
99	1985	Reagan	R	R	D
99	1986	Reagan	R	R	D
100	1987	Reagan	R	D	D
100	1988	Reagan	R	D	D
101	1989	Bush I	R	D	D
101	1990	Bush I	R	D	D
102	1991	Bush I	R	D	D
102	1992	Bush I	R	D	D
103	1993	Clinton	D	D	D
103	1994	Clinton	D	D	D
104	1995	Clinton	D	R	R
104	1996	Clinton	D	R	R
105	1997	Clinton	D	R	R
105	1998	Clinton	D	R	R
106	1999	Clinton	D	R	R
106	2000	Clinton	D	R	R
107	2001	Bush II	R	D/R	R
107	2002	Bush II	R	R	R
108	2003	Bush II	R	R	R
108	2004	Bush II	R	R	R
109	2005	Bush II	R	R	R
109	2006	Bush II	R	R	R
110	2007	Bush II	R	D	D
110	2008	Bush II	R	D	D
111	2009	Obama	D	D	D
111	2010	Obama	D	D	D
112	2011	Obama	D	D	R
112	2012	Obama	D	D	R
113	2013	Obama	D	D	R
113	2014	Obama	D	D	R
114	2015	Obama	D	R	R
114	2016	Obama	D	R	R
115	2017	Trump	R	R	R
115	2018	Trump	R	R	R
116	2019	Trump	R	R	D
116	2020	Trump	R	R	D

Between 1965 and 2018, divided government has been the dominant form, prevailing for thirty-four of the fifty-four years, unified government in the remaining twenty years. In fact, the election of President Clinton ended the longest sustained period of divided government in the history of the Union. The 2018 election now adds two more years of divided government to that total.

In *Federalist Paper* No. 47, James Madison wrote, “The accumulation of all power, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” Further, in *Federalist* No. 51, he wrote,

In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own... It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government.

In general, down through the generations, Americans have been wary of too much accumulation of power by any one group, be it political, economic, or social. This explains why divided government tends to be the rule, not the exception, within American politics.

On the one hand, divided government may mean more partisanship and gridlock, as there are ample examples of this in recent years. On the other hand, it can sometimes also result in major legislative accomplishments. In fact, Senator McConnell’s view, as expressed in a meeting with *New York Times* editors and reporters in 2011, is that divided government is a perfect time to do big things. This does, however, stand in contrast with his approach during the Obama Administration when he worked to block almost all of President Obama’s agenda. We can expect a Democratic House to take a similar approach to most of President Trump’s agenda.

Legislative accomplishments, however, do occur in divided government, as seen with the analysis of Yale political scientist David Mayhew who carefully identified 267 important laws enacted by Congress between 1947 and 1990 to determine which periods were most productive. He found that under unified government, each two-year Congress enacted an average of 12.8 important laws. Under divided government, each Congress enacted only one fewer, 11.7, a figure understated by counting the sweeping budget and tax cuts of 1981 as just two laws. In the 1960s and early 1970s, for example, Congress passed numerous laws on civil rights, social policy and environmental protection. Much of this happened under two Republican presidents, Nixon and Ford, whose administrations were productive legislatively notwithstanding divided government. Then, during the 1980s, a conservative wave induced a Democratic Congress to go along with President Reagan on a series of major policy changes in a more conservative direction:

- Overhaul of Social Security in 1983 negotiated by President Ronald Reagan and Speaker Tip O’Neil.
- Changes to the tax law enacted in 1986 (Reagan was president; Democrats still controlled the House).

- Domestic spending reductions and a defense build-up in the 1980s under divided government with Reagan and a Democratic Congress.

Democrats had near solid control of both houses of Congress since Franklin Roosevelt's election in 1933.¹ That trend was broken by Republican's capture of the Senate for the first time since 1955 when Reagan was elected president. Democrats' hold on the House would only be broken in 1995.

When President Clinton assumed the Presidency, he had a unified government for two years but lost it for the remaining six years of his serving in office. Yet, it was in 1996 under divided government (Republicans controlled both Houses of Congress) that he reached a major welfare reform agreement with Congress.

Major policy changes have occurred when national conditions or the public mood demanded them. They have not necessarily required a unified government. However, the last two decades have produced the least productive Congresses, as outlined below.

We are now entering another of these more common periods of divided government. It is difficult to determine precisely what the implications will mean as we are in a period where many of the traditional and conventional expectations and practices of both government and politics are themselves in flux. The 2016 presidential election and the subsequent Trump Administration have realigned some traditional party positions, such as the Republican stance on deficit spending and free trade. A trend of increasing partisanship has only kept growing, and many members of the entering Congressional class appears to be more hardline in its views than its predecessors. One trend that will emerge is a shift of power from one end of Pennsylvania Avenue to the other. Any legislation that the president requests and any that reaches his desk will require support from majorities in both houses of Congresses, and with Democrats controlling one of those houses, their—and therefore Congress's—bargaining power has substantially increased. Regardless of the exact specifics, there will be changes and challenges in accomplishing some of the basic functions of government. Given all of this turbulence, the record from past divided governments provides needed insights on national security going forward.

Historical Trends in Defense Policy

In the specific domain of national security, Congress's roles can be defined within three broad categories: budgetary decisions, strategic policy, and war powers. The budgetary role of Congress relates to its constitutionally enumerated responsibility for the allocation of resources that allows it to raise armies, maintain a navy, and provide the rules and governance thereof. But this role, by nature, extends into such areas as

¹ With the exception of the 80th and 83rd Congresses.

military facilities and base infrastructure, weapons procurement, and personnel policies. Strategic policy has more to do with strategy reviews to answer the question of what our national military objectives should be and what it will cost to achieve them. It includes the administration’s approach to defense and foreign policy. Congress also has the sole power to declare war—which it has not exercised since World War II. Congress has largely ceded this authority to the executive branch, which has used its authority to send troops abroad on numerous occasions in that same timeframe. In some circumstances, Congressional authorization was provided via resolutions, such as in the first Gulf War, and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) post 9/11, yet Congress failed to update the AUMF when requested in the Obama Administration.

In the past, Democrats and Republicans have differed in their approaches to each of these three areas. Going back to the Nixon Administration, several trends emerge on defense policy in divided government, specifically during Republican administrations and Democratic Congresses.

Defense Appropriations Averages, FY1950-2019 (in millions \$) ²					
Admin	House	Senate	House vs. Request	Senate vs. Request	Total vs. Request
R	R	R	-984	-1,894	1,336
D	D	D	-1,699	-1,269	-1,285
R	D	R	-11,506	-5,557	-8,771
R	D		-6,887	-4,526	-4,932
R			-4,976	-3,510	-2,996
D			-2,196	-2,952	-2,913
	D		-4,789	-3,210	-3,458
		D	-3,847	-3,507	-3,945
R		D	-5,036	-3,921	-3,597
	R		-1,810	-3,618	-2,139
		R	-3,886	-3,256	-1,384
D	R		-2,983	-5,616	-5,489
D		R	-1,363	-2,558	1,125

As a general trend, Democratic majorities—especially in the House—have supported lower defense spending than requested by Republican administrations, though the final passed budget has usually been closer to the Senate number than the House.³ In

² This chart shows the average differences between the president’s budget request, the House and Senate appropriations bills, and the final bill during different periods of unified and divided government. The 4th column, for example, represents all years of a Republican administration and a Democratic House, regardless of Senate control. The 5th column represents all years of Republican administrations, regardless of Senate or House control.

³ For a complete list of appropriations requests and bills for defense from 1950-2019, see Appendix 1.

FY1970, President Nixon's first year in office, Congress authorized the largest defense cuts since 1954. Nixon had proposed a \$2.5 billion cut from Johnson's original budget, while the House passed \$5.3 billion in cuts. The final budget for FY70 was \$5.6 billion below the Nixon request, despite the still ongoing Vietnam War. In FY1976, a Democratic Congress further lowered defense spending by \$7.4 billion below the requested level, even despite Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's strong warning that it would put US forces at a disadvantage against the Soviet Union.

The Reagan era saw the largest difference between administration requests and passed budgets. Between FY1984 and FY1988, the passed budget was, on average, \$18.6 billion lower than the administration request, with the largest cut in FY87 of \$25 billion. It is important to note that during this time, year over year growth was still increasing—just at a lower pace than the Reagan Administration requested. Despite the reductions, the Reagan build-up is still referred to in glowing terms—though few remember a number of his budget requests were not approved. Democrats were increasingly concerned with growing defense budgets in the face of growing deficits and Reagan's unwillingness to raise taxes or boost domestic spending.

In FY1991, a Democratic Congress enacted a \$17 billion budget cut from the previous year—\$18.3 billion below President Bush's request—as a result of the end of the Cold War and a signal to the administration that it needed to change its defense strategy.

In terms of specific programs and policies, arms control and nuclear issues, major weapons systems, social and environmental issues, strong oversight, and opposition to overseas operations have been major areas of tension between Republican presidents and Democratic Congresses.

Nuclear weapons have always been a contentious topic between the two parties. Republicans, in general, have supported weapons and tended to distrust arms control efforts, while Democrats have been much the opposite. Between FY1971 and FY76, Congress restricted Nixon and Ford's anti-ballistic missile expansion plans and pushed back on the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) missiles. This trend was especially evident during the Reagan Administration, when Democrats were skeptical of Reagan's commitment to arms control. The House voted multiple times and actually passed a symbolic nuclear arms freeze in 1983. There was also strong opposition to Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, MX missiles, and anti-satellite (ASAT) missile development, with Congress seeking to limit funding to all those programs throughout his administration.

Democrats also tended to be more skeptical of major weapons systems, mostly due to their massive cost overruns. They were skeptical of building additional nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in 1970 and in FY1977, the House rejected the administration's plan to build six new warships to counter the Soviets. In the late 1970s, a number of the more

liberal members attacked the Army's Big Five programs but they were fully supported by large bipartisan majorities. During the Reagan years, Democrats charged that Reagan was sacrificing readiness (ammunition and training time) for major weapons systems, and made procurement their biggest target for finding DOD savings. Democrats have also pushed back on the B-2 bomber and other major weapons systems, the Army's Future Combat System, and various missile systems.

Democrats have also strongly upheld the Armed Services Committees' tradition of oversight of the Pentagon, specifically on the issues of cost overruns and headquarters staff and personnel policies. Beginning in 1974, Congress demanded stronger oversight of CIA activities, resulting in the Church Committee and Pike Committee's major investigations into the intelligence community in 1975. This resulted in the shift of intelligence oversight from the defense committees to the newly created intelligence committees. 1983 saw the beginning of stronger procurement oversight of DOD that led to the Packard Commission and its acquisition reforms. Democratic Reps. Jack Brooks and John Dingell also launched aggressive oversight investigations into the Pentagon from the House Government Operations and Energy and Commerce Committees, respectively. Strong oversight of the Pentagon within the committees of jurisdiction is, however, a bipartisan issue, with both Democrats and Republicans leading investigations into the executive branch—regardless of party in power—throughout the years. These included Desert One, the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing, academy and recruiting scandals, the *Iowa* explosion, Somalia, and many more. The Pentagon should expect the same level of scrutiny with the new Congress, including from outside the traditional defense committees.⁴

In line with their domestic agendas, Democrats try to pass more social and environmental changes affecting the Defense Department. In 1974, a Democratic Congress successfully overrode President Ford's veto of H.R. 12628 expanding vocational and education benefits for Vietnam veterans. In 2008, a Democratic Congress passed the largest expansion of the GI Bill since WWII in that year's Overseas Contingency Operations funding bill. Several other social issues championed by Democrats included opening combat roles to women beginning in 1991 and Don't Ask, Don't Tell and its repeal.⁵ Democrats have also sought to ensure that DOD is a responsible steward of the environment, such as with the 1986 Defense Environmental Restoration Program and with several environmental cleanup issues passed in FY1991.

Another major area of contention has been Democrats' opposition to overseas operations, showing Congress's enduring but partial interest in its war powers authority. In 1973, Congress overrode Nixon's veto of H.J.Res. 542 to limit the president's powers to commit US forces abroad without Congressional approval. The War Power Act has

⁴ During my tenure as staff director, Sen. Nunn as Chairman worked with the HASC, unsuccessfully, to restrain the House non-jurisdictional committees from investigating the Pentagon.

⁵ Both DADT and its repeal were passed in unified Democrat government.

been a continuing source of tension between the legislative and executive branches ever since. During the Vietnam War, Congress sought to limit in scope the Nixon Administration's actions, including a ban on ground troops in Laos and Thailand in FY70, limits on aid to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in FY71, and reductions in foreign aid to Vietnam and reduction in troops overseas in FY75. Democrats were also opposed to a large troop presence in Europe after the end of the Cold War. And though both authorizations ultimately passed, many Democrats voted against the Persian Gulf War resolution in 1991 and the Iraq War resolution in 2003. In 2007, Democrats opposed Iraq and Afghanistan funding unless it was accompanied by policy changes and withdrawal dates from the Bush Administration.

We can expect some of these policy differences to continue in the new 116th Congress, with nuclear weapons, arms control, and overseas operations being the major areas of concern, as discussed below. However, the HASC and SASC have always operated in a bipartisan approach, and I fully expect this to continue.

The Use of Presidential Vetoes in Divided and Unified Governments

One of the strongest levers of powers possessed by the president is the veto. Before using it, the White House usually tries to determine whether or not enough votes can be mustered to sustain a veto, either 146 votes in the House or 34 votes in the Senate.⁶

In signaling to Congress its displeasure with a bill, the White House uses three gradations of veto threats, (1) the strongest veto threat being that the "president will veto the bill if passed." (2) The intermediate threat is that "the president's senior advisors" or "the president's advisors" will recommend a veto. (3) The weakest form of a veto threat is that one or more "Cabinet Secretaries will recommend a veto." The Executive Branch signals these threats to the Congress both informally through the White House Legislative Affairs Office and through formal communications known as Statements of Administration Policy (SAP). After the issuance of one of these SAPs, behind-the-scenes discussions take place to see if offending provisions can be modified or changed before its passage. If not, the Constitution requires that the president return a vetoed bill to the Congress within ten days of its receipt at the White House with an explanation of his objections in a veto message. If the veto threat is not at the presidential level, it is often the case that the president ultimately signs the bill but, again, the White House Legislative Office works with Congress to make the objectionable provisions more acceptable. Often, the Cabinet Secretary and the White House closely coordinate on these efforts. While presidents have succeeded in vetoing certain provisions out of bills, they cannot veto provisions into bills.

⁶ These numbers are one third plus one and assume all Members vote on the override.

If Congress has adjourned, a president may “pocket veto” a bill because he cannot return it to Congress. In recent administrations, this has rarely happened.

Recent presidents have generally been able to sustain their vetoes, which makes the veto threat an effective tool. Between the Kennedy and Obama Administrations (1961 to 2017) there were 374 vetoes but only 38 successful overrides by Congress.⁷

Appropriations bills have been vetoed 43 times since 1960, with four of those vetoes overridden. Though several of these vetoes were continuing resolutions that would have included defense funding, the Defense Appropriations Bill itself has not been vetoed. The White House has only vetoed the National Defense Authorization Bill five times since 1961, the most recent being in 2015 during the Obama Administration. Not all five vetoes occurred during periods of divided government. President Carter vetoed the defense authorization bill for FY1979 that the democratically-controlled Congress sent to the White House (H.R. 10929) because he objected to the bill's authorization of almost \$2 billion for a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. After the House sustained the veto, the Congress passed a second FY1979 authorization bill that did not authorize funding for the carrier and the president signed the bill into law on October 20, 1978.

President Reagan vetoed the FY1989 NDAA (H.R. 4264) over Congress's cuts to his Strategic Defense Initiative program, ballistic missile submarines, and ICBM modernization programs. He described these cuts as “unilateral concessions on arms control [to the Soviet Union].” Almost two months later, Reagan signed the updated NDAA (H.R. 4481) with those provisions removed.

In the case of the bill vetoed by the Obama Administration in 2015, the NDAA (H.R. 1735) would have authorized essentially the total amount requested by the president for defense-related spending but without changing the current budget caps. The bill would have avoided breaking the cap on defense base budget spending by shifting roughly \$38 billion of the total requested for the defense base budget into the OCO budget, which is exempt from the budget caps. The president objected to lifting effectively the spending cap on defense without providing the same degree of relief for nondefense discretionary spending and, accordingly, vetoed H.R. 1735.

The impasse was resolved by the enactment on November 2, 2015, of P.L. 114-74, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA). It raised the discretionary spending caps for both defense and nondefense programs in FY16 and FY17, and also set nonbinding “targets” for discretionary OCO appropriations in both the defense and nondefense categories, the latter falling within the budget function for international relations. The OCO target cap for defense exceeded the president's defense-related OCO budget request by \$7.9 billion. Thus, the net effect of this was to allow (within the revised budget caps for FY16)

⁷ The following link provides a complete historical listing of presidential vetoes and overrides by Congress: <https://www.senate.gov/reference/Legislation/Vetoes/vetoCounts.htm>

total defense-related discretionary appropriations amounting to \$606.9 billion, which was \$5.0 billion less than the president requested (counting both base budget and OCO funding).

In sum, of the five vetoed defense authorization bills, Congress has passed replacement bills either with or without modified provisions that had been previously veto issues, and the president has signed them despite the fact that the veto did not convince Congress to add provisions he had requested. This reflects how committed the defense authorization committees and the Pentagon are to making sure they get a bill enacted every other year. Many other agencies do not consistently receive an annual authorization bill the way defense does—during periods of both unified and divided governments.

The Current Congressional Environment

By any measure, the current congressional environment on Capitol Hill is contentious. By even the most generous assessments, it is certainly different from the traditional relationships the department enjoyed through the Cold War and into the early years of the 21st century.

Dr. Tom Mann and Dr. Norm Ornstein (who occupy very different positions on the political spectrum), argue in their 2006 book *The Broken Branch* that the problems with Congress escalated with the “collapse of the center in Congress, the growing polarization of the parties, and the decline in accountability... contributed to a climate on Capitol Hill that we found unsettling and destructive.”⁸ Mann and Ornstein noted that although many may argue Congress has actually changed little, “to grizzled veterans like us, with more than thirty-five years of Congress-watching, the differences are palpable and painful. Taken together, they have made for a broken branch, one that needs major change if it is to recapture its proper role in the constitutional system.” In *It’s Even Worse Than It Looks*, written in 2012, Mann and Ornstein argued that both political parties had become quite extreme in their views and adversarial in their approach to politics and governing. There is little evidence from the last six years to suggest they would change their assessments.

This condition described by Mann and Ornstein, combined paradoxically with increased party fractiousness, and enhanced by the weakened positions of senior Congressional leadership that began as far back as the post-Watergate period, has resulted in a

⁸ Dr. Tom Mann (Brookings) and Dr. Norm Ornstein (American Enterprise Institute) have co-authored two books on the topic: *The Broken Branch: How Congress is Failing America and How to Get It Back on Track* (Oxford Press, 2006), and *It’s Even Worse Than You Think: How the American Constitutional System Collided With the New Politics of Extremism* (Basic Books, 2012):

contemporary Congress where power is widely dispersed, unevenly applied, and more influenced by internal caucuses and outside groups than in previous eras.

Where party leaders in both houses and committee chairmen once wielded enormous power allowing for issue resolution by a small number of people, today numerous power sources must be considered—especially in the House of Representatives where recent Speakers, both Boehner and Ryan, have constantly struggled to control their own conference on certain issues.

The challenge this presents is that issues now must be adjudicated with numerous members (and staff), some of them not even members of appropriate committees of jurisdiction. In short, a function that has always been hard, and fraught with downsides, is now even more so. This is made even worse by the increasing partisanship within our country, reflected in the members they send to Congress. There are major differences even within parties—from arguments on deficit spending and trade wars on the Republican side to the scope of government's role in society on the Democratic side—that make it more difficult to reach agreements now than in the past. For defense, this enhances the need to remain as bipartisan in approach as possible to avoid being politicized and dragged into partisan food fights.

While the SASC, HASC, SAC-D, and HAC-D remain fairly bipartisan in their approach, the three basic processes in Congress; budget, authorization, and appropriation, are currently badly bent, if not broken. While the Authorization Committees continue to pass the annual defense authorization bill since first established by Sen. Richard Russell in 1959, in recent times it is hardly ever done in time to guide the appropriations process (of course, most appropriations committees outside of defense seldom have authorization bills to guide them), or passed prior to the beginning of the fiscal year. In recent years, no Senate version cleared the upper chamber, so the conference report relied on only the Senate Armed Services Committee approved version. The authorization bill in its early years was five pages of bill language and four pages of report language; the FY19 Senate bill was 1,140 pages and the House report was 569 pages. The final bill and report were 1,360 pages.

The budget process, which is supposed to set overall spending and revenue totals with an agreed concurrent budget resolution, has failed at least six times in the past ten years. This means there has been no agreed budget to guide the spending process. The last time all twelve appropriations bills were passed by the start of the fiscal year was twenty years ago in 1996 (FY1997). The fiscal year has started with a continuing resolution (CR) for twenty straight years, with a notable exception that FY19's CR covered only 13% of discretionary spending, while the remaining 87% of spending had a full-year appropriation, including defense.

Sixty votes are required in the Senate to pass authorization and appropriation bills, and there is no “nuclear option” or reconciliation procedure to bypass this requirement. For example, it is highly unlikely the Democratic leadership in the Senate will agree to increased spending on defense absent some “deal” on domestic spending. It will take sixty votes to repeal the sequester caps which are still binding on non-OCO defense spending and are independent of domestic offsets.

The outside lobby groups from veterans based (American Legion, VFW, Iraq & Afghanistan vets) to service based (AUSA, Navy League, AFA, Marine Corps League, NGAUS) to industry (NDIA, AIA, PSC) to benefits based (MOAA, military associations) have demonstrated a far greater ability to shape legislation, contrary to Pentagon wishes, than in previous eras. Some associations have shifted their approach from pushing for a strong national defense to advocating more benefits for their members, whether it is a policy shift, or a higher benefit, or blocking DOD’s requested reforms. A former Deputy Secretary of Defense has summed up this shift as follows: The slogan has changed from “praise the lord and pass the ammunition” to “praise the lord and pass the benefits.” The individual defense companies’ lobbying expenditures (and political contributions) are at an all-time high and the Congress has developed “work arounds” to the “ban” on earmarks. Multiple attempts at requested Pentagon reforms have been blocked in the Congress.

It is within this difficult reality that DOD must adapt in its approach. Despite the current climate, however, Congress has always been the nexus of disagreements, arguments and, ultimately, compromises and governing. While this current period may seem more extreme than before, it is important to view it in historical context. The current Pentagon leadership working with the defense committees of jurisdiction have passed the authorization and appropriation bills in each year of the new administration.

Emerging Differences between Democrats and Republicans on Defense Policy and Programs in a New Congress

On the nuclear issue, the debate has already begun. The current edition of *Foreign Affairs* asks on its cover “Do Nuclear Weapons Matter?” Inside, six essays by accomplished scholars explore this provocative title offering arguments essentially covering the spectrum from nuclear weapons do not matter, to they do and we would be downgrading or dismissing them at our peril. At the same time, one of the major expenses for DOD is the cost of replacing or modernizing the nuclear deterrent force.

All three legs of the nation’s nuclear triad require modernization. The existing ballistic missile submarine fleet (Ohio-class ships) is quickly reaching the end of its operational life. Simultaneously, the Minuteman III land-based missiles require serious upgrading, especially in regards to its command and control network and procedures. The bomber fleet has its own aging issues. In addition, the Trump Administration has recently

announced an intention to withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, an agreement that eliminated an entire category of land-based nuclear weapons. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty would presumably presage the acquisition of a new family of weapons replacing those destroyed under the treaty's provisions.

Representative Adam Smith (D-WA), who is now likely take over the House Armed Services Committee, has already signaled a disagreement with the Trump Administration's nuclear weapons funding and program. He believes that the *Nuclear Posture Review* calls for more nuclear weapons than he or most Democrats think are needed. In his view of the larger budget picture, that is not the best place to spend the money. A group of Democrats signaled even stronger change could be coming when they recently introduced bills that seek to prohibit the research and development, production, and deployment of low-yield Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). But, regardless of the number of nuclear weapons, the funding requirements for just maintaining and refurbishing the existing nuclear infrastructure are daunting and will cause difficult funding tradeoffs between nuclear and non-nuclear programs. This approach is entirely consistent with previous times Democrats have controlled the HASC and caucus in the era of Speakers Tip O'Neill, Tom Foley, and Nancy Pelosi.

Rep. Smith has also pointed to another difference with the Administration on where the military is engaged and suggests withdrawing from places that may not be in our best interest and are not transparent. He believes that the Administration is too stretched across the world with too many missions in a wide range of countries. In his view, Congress can or should become more involved in making decisions about military involvement. This again is a historic norm for Democratic chairs and caucuses.

In particular, the Administration's support of Saudi Arabia in Yemen will be a growing issue. Senator Reed, the Senate Armed Services Committee Ranking Member, has also come out with new conditions in US support of the Saudis—ending the refueling of their planes and limiting weapons sales to defensive ones.

It is very early to tell how such potential differences would affect appropriations or defense authorization bills. But these signals, along with the history of how Democratic majorities mark up the defense bills, suggest those areas where Congress will differ on policy or resource distribution.


What Divided Government would mean for the Defense Topline

Given our politically-divided country at the moment, divided government may well lead to more partisanship and gridlock, particularly on domestic priorities. But, will defense be hurt by such an electoral outcome? For example, what does divided government mean for the defense topline? Probably not as much as one would think. Previous periods of divided government show that both the president and Congress have ultimately worked together when it came to how much money to spend on defense,

even though they would communicate and advertise their policy differences up to the last moment.

- Reagan submitted requests to Congress (Future Years' Defense Plans or FYDPs) showing higher defense growth than appropriated by Congress. Yet, Reagan signed the lower appropriations bills, which in some cases were significantly lower than he requested. In the six years where there was a Republican Administration, a Republican Senate, and a Democratic House the defense base budget increased an average of \$25B per year. The defense base budget could similarly increase should the recent initiatives to move OCO to base be approved in FY20 or later years. During the same six-year period, the average amount appropriated for defense was \$8.7B lower than the amount requested (or -3.9%), with the Senate level being \$5.6B lower and the House level being \$11.5B lower. Final appropriations were delayed an average 68 days from the beginning of the fiscal year (ranging from a low of 12 days to a high of 90 days).
- In the 1990s, the Clinton administration repeatedly projected lower defense spending in its FYDPs than Congress ultimately appropriated. But, President Clinton signed the appropriations bills.
- Similarly, the Obama administration repeatedly projected higher defense budget requests than appropriated by Congress—even with a Republican House and Senate—which adhered to the Budget Control Act (BCA) and the caps it placed on the defense budget. Yet, again the Obama Administration signed those bills. The president's primary policy concern, expressed in his veto, was that domestic priorities had to be treated on par with defense if increases above the spending caps were authorized.

The pattern of accommodation suggested above may be because the spending differences between the Executive and Congress were never of such significant magnitude to merit bigger political fights. Also, getting defense money appropriated and available for obligation always becomes the imperative due to its ties to national security and the significant number of government, civilian, and contractor jobs provided.




So, what might happen to the defense topline after the new Congress is sworn in? To begin with, the Administration’s current plans already suggest a constraint in future defense funding requests. Trump and the Pentagon have already stated that the national security budget for FY20 could be \$700 billion, a \$33 billion reduction from FY19’s original plan. This is not an unusual development and history is replete with projected future year spending plans that come in lower than the previous year’s projections. And absent a new budget agreement for FY20, defense and domestic spending will be again subject to the sequester caps.

The bottom line for defense base budget funding projections are dependent on the outcome of the FY20 negotiations. All scenarios assume a flat base defense budget in FY21 and beyond, increasing at the rate of inflation. This would be consistent with the annual increases seen under prior divided government administrations. However, given the historical pattern of House reductions to the topline, administrations should start with the highest number possible. In today’s circumstances, the \$733 billion is the recommended starting point.

An indicator towards the most likely case being at or near the recently announced FY20 requested level is that the Democrats are also signaling some constraint. Asked specifically if \$716 billion is the right number for defense and whether future budgets will stay at that level, Rep. Adam Smith recently said at the second annual *Defense News Conference*, “I think the number’s too high, and it’s certainly not going to be there in the future.” The congressman argued that the debt and deficit situation have to be seriously addressed. It is important to remember, though, that 67.5% of House Democrats and 85% of Senate Democrats voted in favor of the \$716 billion for defense in 2019—pretty significant majorities and a considerable testament to the Pentagon leadership.

Fig. 1: Debt Held by the Public Under the President’s Budget (Percent of GDP)



Sources: OMB, CBO, and CRFB calculations.
 *Re-estimate is rough, preliminary, and subject to revision.

Ballooning deficits are also going to be a major concern in years to come. During the mid-1980s, when deficits were believed to be out of control, Congress passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget Act, which included control mechanisms to keep spending deficit neutral. This was also the Republican House position during all of the Obama Administration. We now have deficits that dwarf the conditions for GRH, and the House Freedom Caucus is likely to return to its roots and lose their amnesia on deficits they acquired over the past two years. Any deal they would support is unlikely to get Democratic support in the House, or get to a sixty-vote margin in the Senate. Senate Republicans increased their majority but did not get to sixty, and they will not be willing to remove that sixty-vote requirement for policy or spending bills.

The sequester is also a complicating factor. Absent another budget agreement, the sequester levels automatically return and could result in \$60+ billion less available for DOD than the FY19 appropriated base budget. The difficulties cited above are further complicated by the Administration’s apparent failure to spend domestic discretionary funding at the levels agreed to. For example, FY18 domestic outlays were \$72 billion, or 2.3%, lower than the agreed levels. The underspending is greater than the increases

agreed to—\$60 billion in FY18. Democrats will be very reluctant to agree to a defense and domestic deal unless there are ironclad guarantees that the money will be spent.⁹

Despite all of these complicating factors, when all is said and done in the appropriations conference between the House and Senate, and in communications with the Administration, an agreement on funding—while more difficult to achieve than in the first two years of the Trump Administration—will occur. Senate Republicans have 22 seats up in 2020 and the Congressional body politic understand that a functioning government is better than a non-functioning one. A veto of an appropriations bill is unlikely, though not impossible. After the big increase for defense of the last two years, the outcome for defense resources in 2020 is not likely to be another big increase. If the resurgent concern over deficits dissipates, then Congress and the president may be more generous. The biggest concern for the Democrats would continue to be that defense and domestic spending are treated similarly vis-a-vis the caps.

How should the Secretary of Defense Respond to Divided Government?

On a positive note, while the recent election suggests a nation that is still sharply divided, it is not divided by any “anti-defense” sentiment, as was seen in the 1970s. Observers then noted that “both the disillusionment with the ‘imperial presidency’ and the anti-defense mood of the country after Vietnam pushed Congress into ever more detailed scrutiny.”¹⁰ Indeed, if anything, given the strains and sacrifices demanded of the military during the past seventeen years, the favored status of the military based on performance and results makes defense and defense spending less controversial than it has been in the past. However, deciding on necessary defense spending levels and determining where cuts must be made elsewhere will still involve a spirited debate.

The role of the Secretary becomes more important in this environment, especially building or maintaining relationships across the aisle with new authorization and appropriations committee heads. Taking a constructive and pragmatic approach to policy discussions on the Hill should further cement such relationships. While not undermining the White House, the Secretary’s relationships can serve in a critical way to move the process along, be it appropriations or authorization bills or policy issues before other committees. The Secretary can help to serve as a linkage between Congressional committees, White House legislative affairs, and the National Security Council when they might have equity in a particular issue. The White House tends to have more relationships at a very senior level in Congress as opposed to Committees where the Secretary can play the major role. If the White House tends to be more ideological or partisan, the Secretary can and should play the role of broker to ensure

⁹ It is not apparent if there is any prior case law that determines when a “failure to obligate” becomes an impoundment, absent an Administration statement that they refuse to spend the money.

¹⁰ Robert J. Art, “Congress and the Defense Budget: Enhancing Policy Options, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol 100, No. 2, Summer 1985, p. 232.

that national security equities are understood and acceptably met. For example, in cases of veto threats from the White House, the Secretary can play an important role in helping resolve issues with the bill so that the cause for the threat is removed. Or, if the veto does occur, he can work with Congress and the White House on a new bill that resolves the issues.

Finally, while the Secretary must first and foremost be an advocate for DOD's equities, recognizing the principle that domestic and defense spending are linked, as has been reflected in previous statutory changes to the caps. Support for that linkage will only increase now that the House is Democratically controlled. And, both the Obama and Trump Administrations have either embraced (Obama) or accepted (Trump) it to date. This does not require a dollar-for-dollar match. The Secretary should also ensure an advantageous relationship with the new majorities, and closely coordinate with both the Chairmen and Ranking Members in the Senate. History shows the stronger conference position is one that has both the SASC and Senate support.

Appendix 1: Defense Appropriations – Request vs. House vs. Senate vs. Actuals (In thousands \$)

Fiscal Year	Budget Estimates	Approved by House	Approved by Senate	Appropriation	YoY Actual Chg	House v. Req	Senate v. Req	Actual v. Req	Congress	POTUS	Admin	House	Senate
1950	\$13,248,960	\$13,272,815	\$12,731,834	\$12,949,562	N/A	\$23,855	(\$517,126)	(\$299,398)	81	Truman	D	D	D
1951	\$13,078,675	\$12,910,702	\$13,294,581	\$13,294,299	\$344,737	(\$167,973)	\$215,906	\$215,624	82	Truman	D	D	D
1952	\$57,679,625	\$56,034,717	\$61,103,856	\$56,939,568	\$43,645,269	(\$1,644,908)	\$3,424,231	(\$740,057)	82	Truman	D	D	D
1953	\$51,390,709	\$46,207,177	\$46,403,000	\$46,610,938	(\$10,328,630)	(\$5,183,532)	(\$4,987,709)	(\$4,779,771)	83	Eisenhower	R	R	R
1954	\$40,719,931	\$34,434,140	\$34,511,302	\$34,371,541	(\$12,239,397)	(\$6,285,791)	(\$6,208,629)	(\$6,348,390)	83	Eisenhower	R	R	R
1955	\$29,887,055	\$28,684,250	\$29,217,106	\$28,800,125	(\$5,571,416)	(\$1,202,805)	(\$669,949)	(\$1,086,930)	84	Eisenhower	R	D	D
1956	\$32,232,815	\$31,488,206	\$31,882,915	\$31,882,815	\$3,082,690	(\$744,609)	(\$349,900)	(\$350,000)	84	Eisenhower	R	D	D
1957	\$34,147,850	\$33,635,066	\$34,783,734	\$34,656,727	\$2,773,912	(\$512,784)	\$635,884	\$508,877	85	Eisenhower	R	D	D
1958	\$36,128,000	\$33,562,725	\$34,534,229	\$33,759,850	(\$896,877)	(\$2,565,275)	(\$1,593,771)	(\$2,368,150)	85	Eisenhower	R	D	D
1959	\$38,196,947	\$38,409,561	\$40,042,992	\$39,602,827	\$5,842,977	\$212,614	\$1,846,045	\$1,405,880	86	Eisenhower	R	D	D
1960	\$39,248,200	\$38,843,339	\$39,594,339	\$39,228,239	(\$374,588)	(\$404,861)	\$346,139	(\$19,961)	86	Eisenhower	R	D	D
1961	\$39,335,000	\$39,337,867	\$40,514,997	\$39,996,608	\$768,369	\$2,867	\$1,179,997	\$661,608	87	Kennedy	D	D	D
1962	\$42,942,345	\$42,711,105	\$46,848,292	\$46,662,556	\$6,665,948	(\$231,240)	\$3,905,947	\$3,720,211	87	Kennedy	D	D	D
1963	\$47,907,000	\$47,839,491	\$48,429,221	\$48,136,247	\$1,473,691	(\$67,509)	\$522,221	\$229,247	88	Johnson	D	D	D
1964	\$49,014,237	\$47,082,009	\$47,339,707	\$47,220,010	(\$916,237)	(\$1,932,228)	(\$1,674,530)	(\$1,794,227)	88	Johnson	D	D	D
1965	\$47,471,000	\$46,759,267	\$46,774,401	\$46,752,051	(\$467,959)	(\$711,733)	(\$696,599)	(\$718,949)	89	Johnson	D	D	D
1966	\$45,248,844	\$45,188,244	\$46,877,063	\$46,887,163	\$135,112	(\$60,600)	\$1,628,219	\$1,638,319	89	Johnson	D	D	D
1967	\$57,664,353	\$58,616,445	\$58,189,872	\$58,067,472	\$11,180,309	\$952,092	\$525,519	\$403,119	90	Johnson	D	D	D
1968	\$71,584,000	\$70,295,200	\$70,132,320	\$69,936,620	\$11,869,148	(\$1,288,800)	(\$1,451,680)	(\$1,647,380)	90	Johnson	D	D	D
1969	\$77,074,000	\$72,239,700	\$71,886,893	\$71,869,828	\$1,933,208	(\$4,834,300)	(\$5,187,107)	(\$5,204,172)	91	Nixon	R	D	D
1970	\$75,278,200	\$69,960,048	\$69,322,656	\$69,640,568	(\$2,229,260)	(\$5,318,152)	(\$5,955,544)	(\$5,637,632)	91	Nixon	R	D	D
1971	\$68,745,666	\$66,806,561	\$66,417,077	\$66,595,937	(\$3,044,631)	(\$1,939,105)	(\$2,328,589)	(\$2,149,729)	92	Nixon	R	D	D
1972	\$73,543,829	\$71,048,013	\$70,849,113	\$70,518,463	\$3,922,526	(\$2,495,816)	(\$2,694,716)	(\$3,025,366)	92	Nixon	R	D	D
1973	\$79,594,184	\$74,577,548	\$74,571,698	\$74,372,976	\$3,854,513	(\$5,016,636)	(\$5,022,486)	(\$5,221,208)	93	Nixon	R	D	D
1974	\$77,250,723	\$74,493,609	\$73,235,677	\$74,218,240	(\$154,736)	(\$2,757,114)	(\$4,015,046)	(\$3,032,483)	93	Nixon	R	D	D
1975	\$87,057,497	\$83,393,570	\$82,097,858	\$82,576,297	\$8,358,057	(\$3,663,927)	(\$4,959,639)	(\$4,481,200)	94	Ford	R	D*	D*
1976	\$97,857,849	\$90,219,045	\$90,721,789	\$90,466,961	\$7,890,664	(\$7,638,804)	(\$7,136,060)	(\$7,390,888)	94	Ford	R	D*	D*
1977	\$107,964,472	\$105,397,343	\$104,014,226	\$104,343,835	\$13,876,874	(\$2,567,129)	(\$3,950,246)	(\$3,620,637)	95	Carter	D	D*	D*
1978	\$113,877,280	\$110,328,208	\$110,063,680	\$109,752,800	\$5,408,965	(\$3,549,072)	(\$3,813,600)	(\$4,124,480)	95	Carter	D	D*	D*
1979	\$119,300,283	\$119,179,478	\$116,533,972	\$117,377,721	\$7,624,921	(\$120,805)	(\$2,766,311)	(\$1,922,562)	96	Carter	D	D	D
1980	\$132,320,565	\$129,601,290	\$131,655,290	\$130,981,290	\$13,603,569	(\$2,719,275)	(\$665,275)	(\$1,339,275)	96	Carter	D	D	D
1981	\$154,496,424	\$157,211,492	\$160,847,830	\$159,738,836	\$28,757,546	\$2,715,068	\$6,351,406	\$5,242,412	97	Reagan	R	D	R
1982	\$200,878,234	\$197,443,289	\$208,675,745	\$199,691,264	\$39,952,428	(\$3,434,945)	\$7,797,511	(\$1,186,970)	97	Reagan	R	D	R
1983	\$183,457,310	\$177,066,115	\$177,847,796	\$177,867,548	(\$21,823,716)	(\$6,391,195)	(\$5,609,514)	(\$5,589,762)	98	Reagan	R	D	R
1984	\$197,968,100	\$187,327,500	\$185,897,100	\$187,490,700	\$9,623,152	(\$10,640,600)	(\$12,071,000)	(\$10,477,400)	98	Reagan	R	D	R

Fiscal Year	Budget Estimates	Approved by House	Approved by Senate	Appropriation	YoY Actual Chg	House v. Req	Senate v. Req	Actual v. Req	Congress	POTUS	Admin	House	Senate
1985	\$292,221,823	\$268,291,632	\$278,112,105	\$274,398,173	\$86,907,473	(\$23,930,191)	(\$14,109,718)	(\$17,823,650)	99	Reagan	R	D	R
1986	\$303,954,000	\$276,598,300	\$288,250,500	\$281,161,900	\$6,763,727	(\$27,355,700)	(\$15,703,500)	(\$22,792,100)	99	Reagan	R	D	R
1987	\$299,032,138	\$267,769,416	\$274,695,897	\$273,999,006	(\$7,162,894)	(\$31,262,722)	(\$24,336,241)	(\$25,033,132)	100	Reagan	R	D	D
1988	\$293,887,908	\$266,780,254	\$278,044,604	\$278,982,848	\$4,983,842	(\$27,107,654)	(\$15,843,304)	(\$14,905,060)	100	Reagan	R	D	D
1989	\$283,159,445	\$282,602,828	\$282,572,013	\$282,412,350	\$3,429,502	(\$556,617)	(\$587,432)	(\$747,095)	101	Bush I	R	D	D
1990	\$286,000,000	\$286,000,000	\$286,000,000	\$286,000,000	\$3,587,650	\$0	\$0	\$0	101	Bush I	R	D	D
1991	\$287,282,674	\$269,281,398	\$268,240,850	\$268,981,467	(\$17,018,533)	(\$18,001,276)	(\$19,041,824)	(\$18,301,207)	102	Bush I	R	D	D
1992	\$270,936,322	\$270,565,792	\$270,257,747	\$269,911,240	\$929,773	(\$370,530)	(\$678,575)	(\$1,025,082)	102	Bush I	R	D	D
1993	\$261,133,500	\$251,866,700	\$250,685,600	\$253,786,600	(\$16,124,640)	(\$9,266,800)	(\$10,447,900)	(\$7,346,900)	103	Clinton	D	D	D
1994	\$240,857,464	\$239,426,512	\$238,820,818	\$240,534,878	(\$13,251,722)	(\$1,430,952)	(\$2,036,646)	(\$322,586)	103	Clinton	D	D	D
1995	\$244,711,179	\$243,564,292	\$243,414,029	\$243,724,188	\$3,189,310	(\$1,146,887)	(\$1,297,150)	(\$986,991)	104	Clinton	D	R	R
1996	\$236,344,017	\$243,997,500	\$242,683,841	\$243,251,297	(\$472,891)	\$7,653,483	\$6,339,824	\$6,907,280	104	Clinton	D	R	R
1997	\$234,678,433	\$245,216,503	\$244,896,904	\$244,277,558	\$1,026,261	\$10,538,070	\$10,218,471	\$9,599,125	105	Clinton	D	R	R
1998	\$243,923,541	\$248,335,303	\$247,184,859	\$247,708,522	\$3,430,964	\$4,411,762	\$3,261,318	\$3,784,981	105	Clinton	D	R	R
1999	\$250,998,803	\$250,727,097	\$250,518,092	\$250,510,548	\$2,802,026	(\$271,706)	(\$480,711)	(\$488,255)	106	Clinton	D	R	R
2000	\$263,265,959	\$268,661,503	\$264,693,100	\$267,795,360	\$17,284,812	\$5,395,544	\$1,427,141	\$4,529,401	106	Clinton	D	R	R
2001	\$284,500,986	\$288,512,800	\$287,630,500	\$287,806,054	\$20,010,694	\$4,011,814	\$3,129,514	\$3,305,068	107	Bush II	R	R	D/R
2002	\$319,547,116	\$317,624,089	\$317,623,483	\$317,623,747	\$29,817,693	(\$1,923,027)	(\$1,923,633)	(\$1,923,369)	107	Bush II	R	R	R
2003	\$366,671,630	\$354,712,914	\$355,405,941	\$355,107,380	\$37,483,633	(\$11,958,716)	(\$11,265,689)	(\$11,564,250)	108	Bush II	R	R	R
2004	\$372,346,314	\$369,190,239	\$369,165,293	\$368,711,561	\$13,604,181	(\$3,156,075)	(\$3,181,021)	(\$3,634,753)	108	Bush II	R	R	R
2005	\$392,824,305	\$391,170,100	\$384,012,400	\$391,170,312	\$22,458,751	(\$1,654,205)	(\$8,811,905)	(\$1,653,993)	109	Bush II	R	R	R
2006	\$397,214,410	\$394,456,182	\$390,216,117	\$416,438,633	\$25,268,321	(\$2,758,228)	(\$6,998,293)	\$19,224,223	109	Bush II	R	R	R
2007	\$420,413,166	\$416,340,489	\$427,329,190	\$436,540,771	\$20,102,138	(\$4,072,677)	\$6,916,024	\$16,127,605	110	Bush II	R	D	D
2008	\$462,880,800	\$459,331,995	\$460,126,000	\$459,331,997	\$22,791,226	(\$3,548,805)	(\$2,754,800)	(\$3,548,803)	110	Bush II	R	D	D
2009	\$481,648,058	\$477,644,889	\$477,644,889	\$477,644,889	\$18,312,892	(\$4,003,169)	(\$4,003,169)	(\$4,003,169)	111	Obama	D	D	D
2010	\$501,090,900	\$497,590,900	\$497,593,900	\$497,670,300	\$20,025,411	(\$3,500,000)	(\$3,497,000)	(\$3,420,600)	111	Obama	D	D	D
2011	\$520,290,000	\$513,271,000	\$512,191,000	\$502,385,000	\$4,714,700	(\$7,019,000)	(\$8,099,000)	(\$17,905,000)	112	Obama	D	R	D
2012	\$531,902,000	\$519,775,000	\$502,774,500	\$507,896,000	\$5,511,000	(\$12,127,000)	(\$29,127,500)	(\$24,006,000)	112	Obama	D	R	D
2013	\$513,015,000	\$511,676,000	\$503,618,000	\$510,132,000	\$2,236,000	(\$1,339,000)	(\$9,397,000)	(\$2,883,000)	113	Obama	D	R	D
2014	\$510,149,500	\$505,737,800	\$509,839,791	\$480,066,600	(\$30,065,400)	(\$4,411,700)	(\$309,709)	(\$30,082,900)	113	Obama	D	R	D
2015	\$485,253,900	\$484,455,800	\$483,116,800	\$483,705,900	\$3,639,300	(\$798,100)	(\$2,137,100)	(\$1,548,000)	114	Obama	D	R	R
2016	\$520,770,000	\$484,077,000	\$482,973,400	\$507,978,000	\$24,272,100	(\$36,693,000)	(\$37,796,600)	(\$12,792,000)	114	Obama	D	R	R
2017	\$511,232,800	\$510,646,100	\$509,466,100	\$509,631,000	\$1,653,000	(\$586,700)	(\$1,766,700)	(\$1,601,800)	115	Trump	R	R	R
2018	\$558,214,400	\$582,274,500	\$582,274,500	\$582,274,500	\$72,643,500	\$24,060,100	\$24,060,100	\$24,060,100	115	Trump	R	R	R
2019	\$600,331,353	\$599,934,364	\$602,466,995	\$601,913,915	\$19,639,415	(\$396,989)	\$2,135,642	\$1,582,562	116	Trump	R	D	R
2020									116	Trump	R	D	R